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FINNS CONCERNED OVER NORWAY STOCKPILING, PROPOSE BORDER PACT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Feb 81 p 9

[Article by Morten Fyhn]

[Text] Helsinki--Finland's official view is still that a nuclear-free Nordic zone should be established. But the debate in Norway has not inspired new optimism. On the contrary some anxiety can be detected with regard to the threat to stability in the Nordic region. The Finns believe it is more realistic today to stress the "preservation" of the Norwegian-Finnish border region and have brought up their old suggestion from 1965 of a ratified agreement with Norway. AFTENPOSTEN learned during an extensive round of high-level talks in Helsinki.

The border idea was presented to Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund during his stay in Helsinki last October in connection with King Olav's visit, in other words at the same time as Ambassador Jens Evensen delivered his widely-discussed speech about a nuclear-free zone. AFTENPOSTEN has learned from several sources that it was Prime Minister Mauno Koivisto who unexpectedly took the matter up with Frydenlund. Neither man would confirm this later. But when asked by AFTENPOSTEN about his view of Finland's need for a border agreement Prime Minister Koivisto replied: "The proposal has come up again to a certain extent between Finland and Norway." He stressed that Finland is prepared to enter into an agreement that would bind the two lands to preventing a military attack against the other country over their respective territories.

Neutrality

Before we examine in more detail Finland's evaluation of the situation in northern Europe today and the problem of why Finland has made concrete overtures to the other Nordic lands we should keep the following in mind:

In the first place Finland is not neutral in the same way as Sweden or Switzerland, for example. The friendship and assistance treaty with the Soviet Union outlines a definite pattern of political and military actions in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union over Finnish territory by Germany or its allies,

clearly a reference to NATO. The treaty does not say that Finland is neutral, it uses this phrase: "in consideration of Finland's effort to remain outside conflicts of interest between the great powers." This is a constant problem for the Finns. In the conflict over the text of official communiquees after Finnish-Soviet visits the Finns fight tooth and nail to retain a statement about Finland's neutrality while the Russians fight equally hard for an emphasis on the treaty's military obligations. The result is viewed in Finland as a barometer of relations between the two countries at that particular time.

In the second place the Finns do not regard the role of the small Nordic lands in international politics as that of a passive recipient. On the contrary, people in Helsinki think these countries have both a duty and a right to work actively in an effort to influence the superpowers. In Finnish thinking this also has a double function, namely to reduce the danger of war and thus reduce the chances that the obligations of the treaty will go into effect as well as to show the Russians that Finland takes seriously its efforts to stay outside conflicts between the superpowers.

This is a well-known factor in Finnish policy but there is a widespread and surprisingly deeprooted feeling in Finland that in other countries--and Norway is no exception--people are not fully aware of the problems involved in what the Finns themselves call their "special position." A good many of the people we talked to in Helsinki stressed this point. On the other hand they were not entirely unfamiliar with our counterargument that this lack of understanding is partly due to the special Finnish political language and debate form.

The Finns are first and foremost realists in their foreign policy. It is not based on feelings. Finland and especially President Kekkonen places great emphasis on so-called "preventive diplomacy," in other words an effort is made to detect a threat before it is too close and take steps to avoid the danger, preferably in such a way that few people realize anything has happened. Kekkonen's proposal of a nuclear-free zone in the Nordic lands, first presented in 1963 and later expanded and repeated in 1978, has a clear symbolic value with respect to Moscow and it is obviously related to the fear that the Nordic region, especially the Nordic Arctic, is increasingly subject to the danger of being involved in a confrontation between the superpowers.

Political Security

By repeatedly stressing the importance of a Nordic nuclear-free zone the Finns draw attention to their own exposed position and that of the Nordic region in general. But in talking to AFTENPOSTEN people stressed that they fully understood that i. is mainly the climate between the superpowers that affects the situation of the Nordic lands. If Norway, Sweden and Denmark should back the formation of a nuclear-free zone, against all expectations, the Finns do not believe this would in any way guarantee a substantial improvement in the military security of the Nordic countries. The proposed ratified border agreement between Norway and Finland would not have such an effect either. But if both these Kekkonen proposals could be carried out it would give Finland a sense of increased political, though not military, security.

Threshold Raised

Both proposals are claimed to have the effect--which is not regarded as insignificant--of raising the threshold for superpower intervention in northern Europe. More concretely many leading Finns believe that carrying out the proposals would strengthen Finland's neutrality. The border agreement with Norway would also commit Finland to defending itself against a Soviet attack on Norway across Finnish territory.

Another major Finnish argument for both proposals, made often and freely in public, is that there is a mounting Finnish fear of a controlled and limited nuclear war on the sparsely-populated Nordic Cap and of having the new low-flying cruise missiles fired over Finnish territory. These missiles were a major point in Kekkonen's renewal of the zone initiative in 1978.

The idea of a limited nuclear war is based on the belief that both superpowers would rather avoid total and devastating nuclear destruction. This presents a danger of having nuclear weapons used in northern Europe in an area that has great strategic importance for both superpowers but that at the same time would lead to as little destruction of industrial and economic targets as possible while limiting the number of fatalities as well.

Own Territory Violated

The significance of the cruise missile for Finland as well as for neutral Sweden lies in the simple fact that it flies so low--only a few hundred meters above the ground--that it violates air space in contrast to the intercontinental missiles. A neutral state is committed to preventing such violations but so far no state has managed to develop a technology enabling its armed forces to do this.

In the current situation Finland is following developments in Norway very closely. To simplify somewhat the Finns believe it is in Norway that things are happening. Norway is the most dynamic of the Nordic lands in the security area and Norway is where the hottest public debate is taking place.

A major impression is that Finland by and large does not need to make serious criticisms of Norwegian decisions and attitudes although some people can be quite critical in private conversations. People in Helsinki understand that NATO membership is a firm commitment and that an isolated nuclear-free zone would be hard to reconcile with NATO's overall strategy. But it is believed that a border agreement could be reconciled and an effort is being made to "sell" the idea to Norway as a "trust-inspiring move" in line with other similar steps within the ECSC (European Conference on Security and Cooperation) process. But some Finns who are familiar with both Norway and NATO realize that Norway cannot singlehandedly commit NATO to refraining from an eastward attack in the far north if a war should break out.

Many of the people we talked to in Helsinki did not conceal their anxiety that Norway would make more decisions like those on stockpiling, advanced listening

stations, big allied maneuvers and allied use of Norwegian air bases. NATO's flying and "far-sighted" radar system, AWACS [expansion unknown], was specifically mentioned in this context in central Finnish circles because they believe the Russians will view AWACS in Norway as something well-suited for offensive purposes as well.

There are often differences of opinion between Finland and the Soviet Union as to whether individual Norwegian steps or the sum total of a number of steps are a threat to stability and serve to increase tension in the North. But because Finland's "special position" is what it is the Soviet views will determine public Finnish reactions. It doesn't matter that they might have different views themselves. Pressure from the East is a reality in Finland today.

6578

CSO: 3108

CSCE DELEGATE TO MADRID, MEVIK, DISCUSSES USSR INITIATIVES

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 26 Mar 81 p 18

[Article by Torbjorn Faerovik]

[Text] The Soviet Communist Party Congress in Moscow concluded just 10 days ago, but it can already be seen that some of the initiatives at the congress will be evaluated with great interest in the west. This is especially true of Leonid Brezhnev's proposal to widen the scope of the so-called measures to create trust in Europe, although it is hardly Europe alone Brezhnev has in mind, but also the Far East and perhaps the United States, as well.

"Without doubt, Brezhnev's proposal has created a new opening in negotiations between East and West, but it is still too early to say what the results might be," undersecretary Johan Jorgen Holst of the Foreign Affairs Department told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Undersecretary Holst is the head of the Norwegian delegation at the CSCE negotiations in Madrid, where the question of measures to create trust is one of the main points. Negotiations began on 20 November last year, but until now, they have remained mostly at a standstill--precisely because the Soviet delegation could not accept a Western proposal to widen the scope of the measures to create trust.

In his speech at the party congress, Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union is prepared to extend the measures to create trust in the military area to the entire western portion of the Soviet Union provided, however, that the western countries were willing to take "corresponding" measures and that "they are willing to carry on concrete negotiations concerning measures to create trust in the Far East with all interested countries." The measure in question is primarily prior notification of military maneuvers of a certain magnitude. At present, prior notification is required for maneuvers 250 kilometers into Soviet territory. At the same time, all western European countries are required to give such prior notification for their entire territory.

A French proposal put forward in the fall of last year with the support of the NATO countries would extend the scope of the measures to create trust all the way to the Ural Mountains. In other words, the western countries envision a system that includes all of Europe. Brezhnev is now willing to go along with this, but he demands something in return from the west.

"Brezhnev's proposal, as he expressed it in his speech, was rather vague. We must try to find out what the Russians really mean through negotiations," said under-secretary Holst, who assumed that the Soviet Union would make its proposal more concrete in the near future.

Ambassador Leif Mevik, who is head of the Norwegian CSCE delegation in Ho' t's absence, was of the same opinion.

"The Soviet delegation down here has not yet made any additional comments on Brezhnev's initiative, but in the upcoming days we may expect the Russians to be asked many questions by the Western delegates," Ambassador Mevik said by telephone from Madrid.

"Has Brezhnev's moderate speech led to a change of mood in Madrid?"

"It could not be called a change of mood. We have gradually gotten used to things going slow here, but Brezhnev's proposal concerning the so-called measures to create trust is an interesting initiative which must be examined thoroughly."

In conference circles in Madrid it is assumed that the proposal came as a complete surprise to the Soviet delegation, which would explain the conspicuous silence of the Soviet negotiators.

"What Western concessions does Brezhnev want?"

"The most obvious idea is that he wants a system requiring prior notification of naval maneuvers in the Atlantic and perhaps also prior notification of military maneuvers on American soil. With regard to the proposal for measures to create trust in the Far East, it is assumed that Brezhnev has in mind cooperation among the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the United States."

Although those involved in the conference in Madrid warn against too much optimism at the present time, it is in any case clear that the CSCE conference--primarily because of Brezhnev's speech--will take longer than anticipated. The conference was originally meant to end by 5 March. According to Ambassador Mevik it is now realistic to believe that the delegates will need most of March to conclude negotiations. As of today, none of the 87 proposals that were made in the fall of last year have been withdrawn and work on the draft report is just now beginning.

Perhaps the third CSCE Conference will be a little more exciting and productive than most people believed just a week ago.

/CAPTION/

Permanent leader of Norway's delegation at the CSCE negotiations in Madrid, Ambassador Leif Mevik, sees P. zhnev's initiative at the 26th Party Congress concerning the so-called measures to create trust as interesting. But it remains to be seen what the proposal will mean in practice.

9336

CSO: 3108

POLL SHOWS CLEAR MAJORITY SUPPORT STORTING STOCKPILING APPROVAL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Mar 81 p 3

[Text] The decision to stockpile Allied material in Norway is supported by a clear majority of public opinion. In an opinion poll undertaken by the Norwegian Opinion Institute (NOI) for AFTENPOSTEN, 56 percent support stockpiling and 40 percent are opposed. In the same study, around one-third of those questioned believe that Norway is in rather great danger of being attacked and the overwhelming majority--73 percent--fear that the attack could come from the Soviet Union. The majority--50 percent--believe, however, that stockpiling reduces the danger of attack, while 39 percent believe it increases the danger.

The Norwegian Opinion Institute conducted the poll from 10 to 15 January, basically after the stockpiling question had been decided in Parliament on 13 January. Stockpiling was approved by 95 votes to 13. The minority consisted of the Socialist-Left Party, the Liberal Party, and 9 "renegades" from the Labor Party. The parliamentary debate appeared as a quiet anticlimax after a sometimes agonizing battle in the government's party and a heated public debate in which, among other things, a "people's movement" against stockpiling came into existence, a movement that continues to operate.

NOI first asked a group of 1,104 people, with an equal number of women and men, the following question: "Do you consider the danger that Norway could be attacked by a foreign power to be rather great or rather small?"

Thirty-four percent answered "rather great," while 59 percent answered "rather small." There is a remarkable difference in the breakdown of the women's answers, which indicates a more widespread fear among women than among men. Among the men, 26 percent believe the danger of attack is rather large and 69 percent believe it is rather small. Among the women, the figures are 42 and 49 percent, respectively.

The answers also vary sharply according to party sympathies. Only among Christian People's Party sympathizers did the majority believe that the danger of attack was rather great, while the greatest percentage of those believing the danger is

rather small is found among supporters of the Liberal Party. The relationship between those answering "rather great" and "rather small" is as follows for the various parties:

Labor Party--29 - 63 percent; Conservative Party--32 - 62 percent; Christian People's Party--47 - 43; Socialist-Left Party--30 - 67; Liberal Party--22 - 72; Center Party--34 - 61.

The next question to the entire group was: "From what foreign power do you believe an attack could come?"

In this case, women and men gave the same answer: 73 percent said the Soviet Union. An additional 5 percent said "from the east, the eastern block/Warsaw Pact countries." Five percent said that there was no danger of attack, while 3 percent feared that an attack could come from the United States and 1 percent from China. Otherwise, it is clear that the younger the age group, the more convinced people are that it is the Soviet Union that is the threat. The percentage of undecided responses is relatively high, 14 percent.

In this question too, the Christian People's Party sympathizers stand apart: they seem to be the least sure of where the threat lies. But it is primarily among supporters of the Socialist-Left Party that a varying trend is found: the party has the lowest percentage of people who see the danger from the Soviet Union (54 percent). On the contrary, a fear of the United States is shared by 19 percent, while at the same time the party has the largest percent of people who see no danger of attack at all (12 percent). The percentages of people who fear attack from the Russians are, by party: Labor Party--73 percent; Conservative Party--76; Christian People's Party--80; Socialist-Left Party--54; Liberal Party--76; Center Party--73 percent.

The third question from NOI was as follows: "Do you believe that stockpiling Allied material in Norway increases or decreases the danger of attack against Norway?"

Thirty-nine percent answered that it increased and 50 percent answered that it decreased the danger. Again there is a difference between women and men. Among women, the majority sees increased danger in stockpiling--46 as opposed to 41 percent, while among men there is a considerable majority of the opposite opinion--58 as opposed to 32 percent. Four percent of all those questioned attached no significance to stockpiling in this connection, while 7 percent have no opinion. The belief that stockpiling increases the danger of attack decreases with increasing age and income. In addition, this opinion is more widespread the farther north in the country one goes: 30 percent in Oslo/Akershus, 48 percent in Trondelag/North Norway.

Not surprisingly, when broken down according to party sympathies, the figures show that the skepticism toward stockpiling is greatest in the Socialist-Left Party and least among the Conservative Party supporters. The percentage of those who believe that stockpiling increases and decreases, respectively, the danger of attack is as follows: Labor Party 44 - 45; Conservative Party 18 - 68; Christian People's Party 43 - 47; Socialist-Left Party 94 - 4; Liberal Party 60 - 25; Center Party 36 - 55.

The fourth and final question was: "Are you for or against stockpiling of Allied material in Norway?"

Fifty-six percent are for, 40 percent against, and 4 percent do not know. The majority for stockpiling is considerably larger among men than among women, 63 and 48 percent, respectively. Among the men, 34 percent were opponents, while among women the figure was 46 percent. There was a majority for stockpiling among all age groups, but it was greatest among those over 30. The same trend holds for the higher income groups. Geographically, the supporters are most numerous in Oslo/Akershus (67 percent for, 28 against). In the rest of Ostlandet and in Sør/Vestlandet the figures are 59 - 34 and 50 - 46 percent, while in Trondelag and North Norway, supporters are just in the minority with 48 - 50 percent.

Here, too, political sympathies have a clear impact and again it is the Conservative Party and the Socialist-Left Party that represent opposite poles. Among the parties, the for and against breakdown is as follows: Labor Party 49 - 46; Conservative Party 79 - 18; Christian People's Party 51 - 43; Socialist-Left Party 9 - 91; Liberal Party 30 - 66; Center Party 39 - 40.

Significant Differences

The results of this NOI study, with respect to the stockpiling question by itself, differ significantly from two opinion polls we presented as "This Week's Gallup" on 8 November and 31 January. These surveys were undertaken by Norges Markedsdata (NM) during the last half of September and in December. In the first one, 42 percent were for and 34 percent were against stockpiling. In the second survey, which was intended to measure possible changes in public opinion just before the parliamentary debate, there were about as many for as against, 40 and 41 percent, respectively. Another striking difference is the large percentage of those who were undecided in the NM survey--24 and 19 percent, compared to just 4 percent in the NOI poll.

On the other hand, there is good agreement between the present opinion poll and a telephone survey carried out by NOI for MØRGENBLADET in December: a clear majority for stockpiling. The telephone survey also asked about the danger of attack, where those questioned thought it would come from, and whether stockpiling increased or decreased the danger of attack. The NOI results also agree on these points.

Why NOI and Norges Markedsdata have obtained different results is difficult to determine accurately. Part of the explanation is presumably to be found in the formulation of the questions.

It is an accepted principle that the most neutrally formulated question yields the most reliable results. The question asked by NM in September was: "The question has recently been discussed of whether the United States should stockpile military material in Norway. Do you believe that Norway should say yes or no to this?" In December the question was: "The question of stockpiling American military material is about to be taken up by parliament. Do you believe Norway should say yes or no to this stockpiling?"

One possible objection to NM's formulation is that the words "United States" and "American military material" are "loaded" words in this connection, although it is after all American material that is in question. There is less doubt that NM's formulation may give the impression that it is the United States that has asked for permission to stockpile material and that the question is whether or not Norway should go along with that. To the extent that this is the impression received by those questioned, it can be said that the questions are improperly formulated and that the answers are consequently misleading.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the above-mentioned telephone survey by NOI in December revealed that the respondents were greatly confused as to whether it was the Norwegian authorities who wished to stockpile material, or whether Norway had been requested to accept the material.

Professional pollsters, as well as those who use opinion polls, in addition to "leading" individual questions, are also on the lookout for leading series of questions. If something is indicated in one question that can influence the answer of the questions that follow, the sequence is leading. The NOI survey we present today contains four questions, but the formulation of the individual questions as well as the questions taken as a whole are beyond reproach in this respect. This combination of questions helps put the matter into a proper and necessary perspective.

9136
CSO: 3108

RELATIONSHIP OF PARIS ATTACKS TO FLNC ANALYZED

Arrested Leaders Replaced

Paris LE FIGARO in French 18 Feb 81 p 12

[Article by Jean-Charles Reix: "The Corsican Terrorist Hunt"]

[Text] Attacks that take place seemingly one after the other, bombs set off in public buildings, commercial premises and private homes, and always the signature of the FLNC, the Corsican National Liberation Front that was said to be on the decline on the island and decimated by police on the continent!

The explosion at the Ministry of National Education in Paris on Monday night tends to underline the resurgence of Corsican terrorism. The bomb that wounded three slightly and caused substantial damages, while ruining 100 square meters of offices at 44 Rue de Bellechasse, was destined to strike persons as well as minds this time. Minister of Education Christian Beuillac is convinced of this.

"Given the constant presence of personnel and tenants in the building that was targeted, this attack could have had much more serious consequences," the minister states, condemning "all those who, by their dogmatism and intolerance, are helping create a climate of confrontation and hatred in French public life."

Action Squad

Put back into its context, the attack on the ministry, coming after scattered attacks in the Parisian region on the night of 12-13 February (automobiles destroyed in an Orly parking lot, freight cars bombed at the Gare de Lyon and the bombing of the Italian Office of Tourism on Rue de la Paix), seems to be the response of the separatists to the recent sentencing by the National Criminal Court of nationalists involved in the Bastelica events.

But in Corsica, the FLNC had already reminded authorities of its presence the evening before by setting a stupid record: A total of 58 bombs had been set off throughout the island a few hours after the verdict was pronounced in Paris on 11 February. And yet, the main leaders who had just been sentenced to 4 years imprisonment by the National Criminal Court for the kidnaping of antiautonomists on 6 January 1980 in Bastelica did not belong to the FLNC, but rather, to a legal autonomist movement, the Union of Corsican People.

Is the "FLNC not dead" then? Police officers in charge of the fight against terrorism committed in the name of politics or regionalism are very surprised. Specialists from the Judicial Police and those from General Information who were consulted admit that the results obtained recently (waves of arrests in July and August) have not achieved their purpose.

Since the beginning of this year, in fact, over 100 attacks connected with the situation in Corsica have taken place. The balance sheet for 1980 was 462. The realists admit that the FLNC remains a major mystery to police. Members number an estimated 100 to 300 and the very lack of precision here is eloquent. General Information has a list of 327 sympathizers, 90 of whom are active members, while only 30 are reportedly underground, meaning elements who have gone underground in Corsica and who constitute the hard core of the organization. But this figure is beginning to be dated because it is from documents seized in 1978.

It is obvious that the many questioning sessions and sentencing since that time -- about 50 in 3 years -- have not had the desired effect. Yves Stella, the "thinker" of the FLNC arrested with 15 kg of plastic bomb material in his car and tried in September, has undoubtedly been replaced.

Likewise, Yannick Leonelli, questioned in Tarascon in July and who was named by police as the main "dynamiter" of the movement, found a successor capable of blowing up the Palace of Justice in Paris (31 January) and the Ministry of Education on Monday.

After the arrest of Leonelli and of his presumed chiefs, Jean-Paul Albertini and Jean-Paul Perrot, the following day in Marseille, it was stated in high places that "the action squad of the FLNC on the continent" had been decapitated. Another important result was achieved at the end of May when police officers seized the persons who had just machine-gunned motorcycle gendarmes posted before the Iranian Embassy. But these successes have not produced all the anticipated fruits.

Police Puzzled Over Purpose

Paris LE FIGARO in French 14-15 Fev 81 p 6

[Text] After the "blue night" Wednesday in Corsica, three new bombings were committed in the Parisian region on Thursday night.

These actions, which caused no casualties, were claimed to have been authored by unknown persons belonging to the Corsican National Liberation Front. The claim was made yesterday morning in two telephone calls to AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

At about 13.15 hours, a charge of some 500 grams of dynamite caused major damage at the Italian Office of Tourism on Rue de la Paix. At about 1500 hours, a bomb made of two units of bottle gas for camping exploded under a freight car carrying wine for a Sete company. The car was on a siding at the Gare de Lyon and was only slightly damaged.

Finally, at 1545 hours, a device, again made of a bottle gas unit, exploded in the parking lot at Orly-Ouest under a BM registered in Val-d'Oise. About a dozen vehicles were destroyed.

At about 1600 hours, a correspondent claiming affiliation with the FNLC claimed credit for the action against the Italian Office of Tourism in response to the 11 February sentencing by the State Criminal Court of participants in the Bastelica affair.

On Wednesday night, 53 attacks took place in Corsica following the verdict of the Criminal Court. Authorship of the attacks has not been claimed, but according to specialists, they were carried out using a characteristic tactic of the FNLC and directed at targets that had already been hit by the separatist organization in previous actions.

Puzzled Police

At about 0900 hours, another correspondent claimed authorship of the attack on the Italian Office of Tourism on behalf of the FNLC, stating this time that it was an "act of reprisal against the Italian Government for the ban on Radio-Corse Internationale." He added: "We claim credit for all attacks committed tonight."

At the end of December, the Italian Government banned broadcasts of Radio Corse Internationale from an island situated off the coast of Corsica, invoking a law forbidding broadcasts in a foreign language from Italian territory.

An announced from the radio station thought that the claim was a "provocation." "In fact," he said, "we have repeatedly stated publicly that illegal organizations would not have access to Radio Corse Internationale."

This official also emphasized the "coincidence" between this claim and the appeal of the Italian decision introduced by radio before the Florence court, which is to hand down its ruling in the near future.

Finally, investigators are somewhat puzzled: If the activists were aiming at the Italian Government, why the explosions at the Gare de Lyon and Orly? If, on the other hand, they wanted to protest the verdict of the State Criminal Court, the choice of these three objectives seems incomprehensible.

Police officials indicate that some 60 attacks relating to the Corsican problem have been carried out since the beginning of the year. In such a climate, they do not exclude the possibility that some of these actions may actually have nothing to do with the problem.

11,464
CSO: 3100

ROCKET ATTACK ON SOUTH YEMEN EMBASSY

Military Training Evident

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Feb 81 p 11

[Article by Jean-Charles Reix]

[Text] "Remember Copernic!" The persons who wrote these two words on a wall near the South Yemen Embassy on Rue Georges-Bizet in Paris (16th district), which was struck by two rockets at dawn yesterday, presented themselves as the avengers of all the Rue Copernic victims, a curious signature to a curious attack.

The target chosen would actually seem to point to a country, South Yemen, as being indirectly responsible for the deaths resulting from the explosion of a bomb near the synagogue in the 16th district on 3 October. Four passers-by were killed and 15 Sabbath worshippers wounded.

Those responsible for the attack on the embassy appear to give credence to a rumor already being spread by members of certain special services: The Rue Copernic affair is reportedly linked to the conflict in the Middle East and the man who abandoned a scooter found next to the synagogue wall -- one Alexander Panadryu, according to his fake Cypriote passport -- allegedly came from a training camp for Palestinian terrorists, a camp which, according to the Israelis, is located either in Libya or South Yemen, the only two nations that have tolerated the training of terrorists on their soil.

And yet, nothing in the official investigation conducted by the Quai des Orfèvres crime squad would confirm the hypothesis. One must observe that the rocket launchers accuse but demonstrate nothing. Police therefore tend to consider that yesterday's terrorist act may fit into the already long list of mysterious settlements of Middle Eastern accounts in Paris over the past year.

For example, the Syrian Embassy on Boulevard Suchet was bombed on 29 January 1980. The attack (one dead and eight wounded) was claimed to have been authored by both the Palestinian Resistance and the Jewish Brigades. In June, an Egyptian atom scientist was murdered at the Meridien Hotel and in July, former Syrian prime minister Salah al-Bitar was murdered on Avenue Hoche. None of the investigations into these crimes has led anywhere.

On the other hand, among all these attacks involving explosives, revolvers or machine guns, the use of rockets is an exception, even if it is not the first case: The Ministry of Transport was already hit by a rocket on 15 April 1980. Having said this much, the rocket launchers are seasoned experts. The use of this sophisticated weapon (which is extremely difficult to obtain in France, even by illegal means) requires solid military training.

The persons who attacked the South Yemen Embassy did not actually use a bazooka. They used a launcher they had made themselves, but it was nevertheless highly sophisticated: two 40-cm-long metal tubes set on a chassis. The launcher was equipped with a delayed activation system and could be raised and lowered. It was placed on the wall of a private courtyard separating the Egyptian Embassy from that of South Yemen.

The rockets struck the first-floor windows of the diplomatic building, landed inside and caused heavy damage to an office. On the second and third floors, the apartments reserved for diplomatic personnel were fortunately not affected.

Terrorist Training Camp

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Feb 81 p 11

[Article by Irina de Chikoff]

[Text] For the South Yemen Embassy in Paris, there is no doubt about the authors of the attack on Sunday night. "The real guilty parties are the forces hostile to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, who hope to divert the Yemeni people from their fight to build a better future."

The only Arab country in the Near East with a Marxist-Leninist regime based on the Moscow model, South Yemen is one of the 40 poorest countries in the world, with a GNP of \$350 per person. Once a British colony, South Yemen has been independent since 1967.

At that time, independence and enthusiasm coincided. But the first president of the new republic, Qathran Chaabi, belonged to the right wing of the National Liberation Front. The left wing was dominated by Abdel Fattah Ismail, who very quickly became the country's ideologist before taking over power alone 10 years later. They were 10 years marked by all kinds of plots and the settling of accounts between rival factions. President of the Supreme Council, chief of state and secretary general of the party, Ismail opened South Yemen to thousands of Soviet, East German and Cuban advisers who would train the army and security forces. Scientific socialism was underway. South Yemen, as poor as always, not only became a spectre for this part of the troubled world, but a laboratory of Marxism-Leninism and the high place of Palestinian as well as international terrorism.

It was cited several times as the refuge of the Baader, the Japanese Red Army and fedayeen from the two hard-line branches of the PLO, the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] of Dr Habache and the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] of Hawatmeh. It is even said that the famous terrorist Carlos spent some time there.

Only recently, following the arrest in Madrid of four members of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], the Spanish minister of interior revealed that the four Basques had admitted being trained in a South Yemen camp under the responsibility of PFLP Palestinians. South Yemen denied the accusations, just as it has always denied the presence of Soviet, East German or Cuban bases on its territory, even though they are obvious.

Shortly before the revelations of the Spanish minister of interior, Moscow's man Ismail resigned for reasons of health and Ali Nasser Mohammed, one of his close aides, succeeded him. There was some talk of a "reorientation" at the time, but while practicing a timid opening to moderate regimes in the Gulf, Ali Nasser Mohammed has since shown that in the main, he was remaining faithful to the policies of his predecessor.

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GAUCHER BOOK DESCRIBES COMMUNIST CONTROL OF TERRORISM

Paris LE FIGARO in French 17 Feb 81 p 2

[Review by Annie Kriegel of the book "Le Reseau Curiel ou la Subversion Humanitaire" by Roland Gaucher, Ed. J. Picollec, 1981]

[Text] It is senseless to reduce historic exploits to the tenebrous, underhanded deeds of a few conspirators acting as *deus ex machina* or providential brains. But it is no more intelligent to exhibit disdainful scorn for the fertility of the fringes of the political world where, amidst discretion, if not secrecy, professionals who are already hardened or who hope to become so plan, accompany or complete the movement of the great forces involved in the making of events. Many things have begun or finished at this level and within these confines. Because espionage literature is so rich, one obviously thinks of the special services which no government would seem to do without, as shown by the cost to the United States of the disfavor into which the CIA has now fallen.

But the special services, whose justification remains the gathering of information, especially of a military nature, constitute only one branch -- albeit the classic one -- of a whole set of enterprises and organizations whose status, makeup and real or proclaimed objectives have as their common feature the maintenance of a rather flexible connection with what is within the domain of public, legal action.

It is one of these organizations, known as the Curiel network, that Roland Gaucher sets out to depict: one of the most durable of its type because its chief has been hard at it for over 40 years; one of the most far-reaching also because, enjoying a radius of action at times intercontinental, it has been situated in the midst of phenomena as noteworthy as decolonization or terrorism.

The character of Henri Curiel has attracted the attention of French public opinion on only two occasions: late in the Algerian war, when Curiel was arrested after taking control of a rival network, that of the "suitcase carriers" set up by Francis Jeanson, and at the time of his tragic death in May 1978, when Curiel was cut down by murderers who were never identified or found.

Far from closing the file, this assassination gave rise to a whole silly retrospective hagiography according to which Curiel was a kind of lay saint, a modern-day prophet, an attentive and impassioned healer of the most wicked scourges of the contemporary world: colonialism, fascism, war. In carefully gathering together

all the available information on the man since his birth in the Jewish community in Cairo, his education with the Jesuits and his precocious plunge into the nebulous communist circles in Egypt in the 1930's, Gaucher, who deserves credit for not saying more than he knows and for not delving into the heart of the ambiguities, uncertainties and flacculence that make many episodes equivocal or dubious, deliberately endows Curiel with uncommon stature and charisma, but he vigorously refuses to hold that Curiel was a dreamy idealist or even an opposition or erratic communist.

Agent With Style

For Gaucher, Curiel was an agent with great style, naturally endowed, after a certain point and to a certain extent, with great autonomy, an agent who carried out functions which he largely designated for himself and fashioned to his liking, but one whose institutional links with the international communist movement were never broken or even interrupted, even if they were sometimes strained or went through difficult periods.

Does this mean that Gaucher sees in Curiel the secret leader of the international terrorist movement? Naturally not. Terrorism in the operational sense is not Curiel's field. What interests him, because he is a politician and not a killer, is what happens before and after. Before includes the complicated logistics (money, hiding places, papers, connections and cellular structure) required by the whole underground operation. After comes the deployment of a pluralistic solidarity movement that spins a protective cocoon of vague sympathy around the terrorist core itself, but which in addition, by shifting the real stakes, causes one to hope that terrorism, a distorted, frustrated, minor and transitional form of action, will in the end be replaced by mass action that will be able to engender, on a large scale and out in the open, a situation of actual political crisis.

Humanitarian Cover

Whence the subtitle which Gaucher gives his book: "Humanitarian Subversion." The communist movement, on the scale of its national parties but on the international scale as well, wants to ensure its control over the terrorist system only at a distance and through various intermediaries. It willingly turns over responsibility for "sporadic" actions to leftist organizations that ask only that. On the other hand, it wants to manage directly the political "fallout," which constitutes the only real interest. Within this framework, the Curiel network seems to have been one of the great manipulators of public or private organizations, whether lay or religious, destined in principle to rescue the victims of all political disasters. Actually, even if it had to leave its share to a wide-ranging humanitarianism, it was a question of channeling generosity and compassion in order to make them serve specific disasters! On an even more secret level, it might be a question of supplying a humanitarian cover for operations and underground proceedings that bore no relationship to rescue operations or victims.

There is basically nothing new here: Willy Munzenberg, Noel Field, Henri Curiel: Each one in his own time and under the particular conditions of his time fulfilled the same functions on the fringe of the international communist movement, but

under its control and met their end amidst ambiguous violence. Willy Munzenberg, the antifascist German emigre, was found hanged in a French forest at the time of the 1940 debacle. Noel Field, the American Quaker diplomat, disappeared in a Budapest prison from 1944 to 1954 before being freed, without ever actually gaining freedom, since he shut himself up in a villa in Buda. Finally, Henri Curiel was assassinated in Paris. Roland Gaucher can only examine the 11 hypotheses given about the identity of the murderers. None has been verified beyond any possible doubt.

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NATURAL GAS DEAL WITH QATAR ENVISIONED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Feb 81 pp 64-67

[Text] Bonn wants natural gas from Qatar. Qatar wants arms from Bonn.

Hans-Juergen Wischnewski put in a good word with the chancellor for one of his Arab friends: Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad Al-Thani would like to come to Bonn some time; special treatment is advised.

The sheikh, ruler of the 230,000 inhabitants of Qatar, may expect suitable respect when he comes to Germany on a state visit in May or June. Foreign Ministry State Secretary Guenther van Well flew to Qatar to make preparations for the visit.

There is good reason for Bonn's attentions to the ruler from the Gulf, because Qatar is amply blessed not only with oil but also with giant natural gas deposits.

Seven years ago, a German-American consortium under the leadership of Wintershall AG [corporation] of Kassel discovered a natural gas field in the Persian Gulf off the coast of Qatar; probably 5 trillion cubic meters can be recovered from this field--more gas than there is in all of Europe.

Recovery can begin in a few years. The consortium, in which the German firms Wintershall, Veba Oel [Veba Petroleum] and Deutsche Schachtbau [German Mine Shaft Construction] hold a majority of the shares, with 55 percent in all, has nearly completed preparations; the natural gas recovered from the sea is to be piped to the mainland and is there to be liquefied in a specialized plant. Inasmuch as the natural gas field is very close to land, the production costs are "not bad," in the opinion of Heinz Wuestefeld, chairman of the executive board of Wintershall. At all events, they would be much lower than, for example, the recovery costs for Norwegian gas.

Bonn is especially interested in supplies from the Persian Gulf since other natural gas projects are becoming insecure.

The Norwegians want to supply less natural gas to Germany than they had actually planned. Negotiations with the Algerians have gotten bogged down because of technical recovery and transportation difficulties. The Dutch will reduce their supplies gradually starting in the mid-1980's and will cease altogether during the 1990's.

The super deal with the Soviets on which sights are set is expected to encounter vehement opposition from the new U.S. Government. France, moreover, does not want to take as much gas as originally planned--and accordingly wants to make fewer credits available for pipeline construction.

Only relatively small natural gas supplies from Nigeria and Cameroon in the middle of the 1980's appear to be assured. The natural gas bubble under the waters of Qatar is, therefore, exceedingly enticing. If supply agreements are made soon, Wintershall Chief Wuestefeld promises that the first Qatari gas could be transported to Wilhelmshaven, where a central reloading point for liquefied gas is to be constructed, as early as 1985 and at the latest by 1987.

To begin with, the amount recovered is to be 12 billion cubic meters a year. More cannot be obtained at present with the recovery technology on the Gulf. However, this quantity could readily be doubled later.

Approximately 3 billion cubic meters a year are required by the Qataris for themselves. At the moment, Germans, Japanese, Spaniards and Frenchmen are competing for the remaining 9 billion.

The French has a much better position in the haggling over the gas than the Germans. Paris has fewer scruples in the arms business than has Bonn, and this advantage will become even more important in the future.

Three weeks ago, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait met to consult with each other about arms purchases.

The sheikhs agreed to coordinate their economies under the leadership of Saudi Arabia more closely in the future. General policy: Whoever wants to do business with them--either as supplier of industrial goods or as importer of oil and gas--must make a contribution to the security of the Gulf.

The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud, recently saw in arms deals with the West Germans a "probationary period" for the Gulf states' friendship with the FRG. Qatar's ambassador in Bonn, Mohammed Ali Al-Ansari, argues similarly: "We assure the industrial countries' energy supply; in return, you must do something for our external security."

Qatar would like to have antiaircraft rockets and coastal speedboats.

5586
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MORE EFFICIENT POWER DISTRIBUTION PLANNED BY EDF

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 2 Mar 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Sylvain Gouz]

[Text] The disadvantage of nuclear energy is that to pay less for electricity in the future, it will be better to work on a hot summer night than on a frosty winter morning. Jean Chevrier, the president of EDF [French Electric Company], working in close collaboration with the ministries responsible for overseeing his company, is working on the new electricity rate structure. His goal is to even out power consumption in time.

The differentiation of rates for electric power according to off-peak or peak times is not in itself anything new. At the present time, an industry equipped with medium voltage pays 10.77 francs per kilowatt at the off-peak summer rates, and 29.14 francs during peak times in December, and even as much as 48.40 francs during the approximately 300 "top peak hours" a year, when EDF has to use all of its old power plants to satisfy consumer power demands.

There is a reason for going beyond this: the massive arrival of nuclear energy. "In 1990, nuclear power plants will produce 73 percent of our electricity, compared with only 23 percent today," remarked Robert Robin, the deputy director for distribution of EDF-GDF [French Gas Company].

"Electricity has only one fault; it can not be stored," added one of his colleagues, Jean Bonnafé. This is especially true of the electricity produced in nuclear power plants, whose production can not be adjusted as easily as the production of thermal or water-powered plants. EDF, CEA [Atomic Energy Commission], and Framatome experts are now planning to test a new procedure for adjusting power in one of the Fessenheim reactors. But they don't have very high expectations, as flexibility is not the strong point of nuclear power.

So the new rates will be designed both to discourage customers during peak times and encourage the sale of electricity which continues to be produced during off-peak times.

The first targets will be industrial users. Between now and 1985 EDF plans to offer them two new rates, either green or yellow, depending on how much power they use, making alternate use of the carrot and the stick.

There will be penalties for power consumption during weekdays in winter, and advantages for consumption during off-peak times in summer. The differential, which is now a one to three difference, could range from one to six, with a bonus offered to businesses willing to drop out of the system at peak times.

This stands a good chance of transforming working times and conditions. "There is no point in trying to conceal the fact; this will inevitably move us toward another change in society," claims Rene Monory, the minister of the economy.

But the EDF staff, who are aware they will be bringing about a real revolution by encouraging businesses to work nights or week-ends, claim they are not trying to "control" society. "We aren't forcing anyone to do anything; electricity is not the only factor involved in determining costs. People who work on Sundays are paid double time rates. It is up to business management to add up their accounts."

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CSO: 3100

COAL COMPANIES FIGHT TO REVERSE REDUCED COAL USE

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 20-21 Feb 81 p 17

[Article by hei: "Charbonnages Intends To Continue Putting Halt to Its Decline"]

[Text] Paris, Thursday, 19 February 1981--During the next few years efforts will continue to halt the decline in the French coal supply; last year conditions were already improved somewhat.

According to the most recent plans of Charbonnages de France (CdF), the French state mining company, coal mining in France in 1990 is still expected to yield between 12 and 15 million tons annually, compared with the present goal of only 10 million tons. Plans are that 10 million tons of these envisioned 12 to 15 million tons would be mined in the Lorraine district and 2 to 3 million tons in the Centre-Midi district in southern France.

The Nord-pas-de-Calais territory in northern France, however, would be abandoned entirely because the mining costs are too high. CdF's General Manager Jacques Petitmengin outlined the new coal strategy of the state enterprise: "Yes, national coal will be mined, but not at any price."

Already in 1980 it was possible to reduce significantly the decline in the use of coal in France. Whereas in previous years the decline had amounted to 1 million tons per year, in 1980 the amount of coal mined in France had decreased by only 420 tons to 19.7 million tons.

Now an appraisal of future mining possibilities in French districts is to be conducted by a commission consisting of three French as well as three foreign experts. In addition to the optimization of domestic production, the coal strategy of Charbonnages de France also consists of putting more effort into recapturing lost markets for coal in France and of increasing participation in and control of foreign coal deposits.

Coal consumption in France is not to go below 50 million tons by 1990, which is about 14 percent (at the present time it is 18 percent) of the estimated energy consumption of the country. To attain this goal, households would have to use considerably more coal than they have been using to date, certain branches of industry would increasingly have to replace petroleum with coal and, above all, Electricite de France, the state electric company, would have to construct more coal power plants.

During the next few years the French coal mining company will spend 130 million French francs outside of France for participation in or purchase of foreign coal deposits. Negotiations for such deals are currently taking place in the United States, in Canada, Columbia and Australia. At the present time, the Charbonnages de France is already in control of approximately 150 million tons of coal deposits in the United States and Australia, yielding an annual supply of 4 million tons of coal.

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STATISTICS OFFICE ISSUES REPORT ON ROLE OF OIL IN ECONOMY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Feb 81 p 25

[Article by Bjorn H. Tretvoll]

[Text] Record Growth, First Surplus Since 1969

In 1979 and 1980 the oil industry contributed to a record increase of almost 20 percent in Norway's disposable real income. Oil was also the main reason why Norway in 1980 had a surplus in its foreign economy of 4.7 billion kroner. The growth in the Gross National Product was 3.6 percent. But if we exclude the oil money from the calculations the increase was only 1.5 percent, 2 percentage points lower than in 1979. These figures are taken from the Central Statistics Bureau's publication, "Economic Outlook for 1980."

Measured in current kroner disposable income for Norway, that is the total income distributed in this country, rose almost 42 billion kroner or 22.2 percent from 1979 to 1980. After adjusting it for price developments the growth rate was 11.7 percent compared with 6.8 percent from 1978 to 1979.

For the first time since 1969 Norway had a surplus in its foreign economy in 1980. A deficit of 5.2 billion kroner in 1979 was shifted to a surplus of 4.7 billion kroner in 1980. The improvement of almost 10 billion kroner came entirely from the balance of goods and services which had a surplus of 16.5 billion kroner in 1980. The deficit in the interest and amortization balance rose 0.3 billion kroner to 11.8 billion kroner in 1980.

Total production in Norway passed a market peak in 1980. There was a noticeable decline in exports starting with the second quarter last year. The decline was especially strong among products sensitive to market conditions such as ores and iron and steel. Total industrial production was 1 percent higher in 1980 than in 1979 but the tendency in the second half of the year seemed to be downward.

For 1980 as a whole the labor market was tighter than the year before. Total employment increased 2.2 percent from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 1980. There was a clear upturn in unemployment in the second half but at the same time there was a generally large shortage of certain types of skilled labor.

Market Decline

For 1981 the picture is dominated by the international market decline that started around the beginning of last year. A change is expected sometime this year but prospects for traditional Norwegian export products are labeled "not good." But total demand will increase enough to guarantee full employment in most branches in 1981 too, the report says.

Oil prices will also rise in 1981. Although this increase will not be as large as in 1980 it seems likely that it will be enough to balance the foreign economy in 1981. In this the Central Statistics Bureau is somewhat more optimistic than the Finance Ministry which anticipates a foreign economy deficit of roughly 3 billion kroner in 1981.

The Central Statistics Bureau has made extensive revisions in the figures for private consumption in 1978 and 1979, making them considerably higher than the figures used previously. From 1979 to 1980 private consumption rose 1.4 percent compared to 2.3 percent from 1978 to 1979.

Public consumption rose 3.8 percent while total gross investments went up 2.2 percent. For industry alone investments increased as much as 25 percent in 1980. Housing investments remained about even.

Wages Up 9.4 Percent

Both wages per work year and total company wage costs per work year rose 9.4 percent from 1979 to 1980. This was a break in the development from 1975 to 1979 when growth in wage costs fell from 18.2 percent to 3.3 percent. From 1979 to 1980 real wages per work year declined 1.4 percent after a similar decline from 1978 to 1979.

Direct personal taxation intensified both in 1979 and in 1980 for most income groups and types of household. Tax adjustments were not enough to counteract the automatic increases stemming from inflation. Since 1977 there has also been a real increase in indirect taxes, it was pointed out.

A sharp increase in oil taxes led to the state and insurance administration receiving a total surplus for lending transactions of a good 12.2 billion kroner in 1980 compared to a surplus of 1.1 billion kroner the year before. Public consumption's share of total domestic disposable income fell from 24.8 percent in 1979 to 23.3 percent in 1980.

Uncertainty

"Economic Outlook" is often regarded as a kind of key to economic development in the preceding year. But it should be stressed that the figures in the publication are partly based on estimates for the last months of the year for which no final statistics are yet available. This means that some of the information includes an uncertain element.

The uncertainty is especially great when it comes to figures for the operating results of individual branches, in other words the share of income that can be used to pay interest rates, taxes and stockholder dividends. However it is estimated that the increase for all branches with the exception of oil was close to 25 percent from 1979 to 1980. The increase was substantially larger for service branches than it was for goods-producing branches. Shipping, which has had negative operating results for some years, cut its deficit markedly in 1980. For industry as a whole preliminary calculations show a 25 percent rise in operating results from 1979 to 1980 while the rise from the weak year of 1978 to 1979 was almost 70 percent according to revised and upwardly-adjusted figures.

For wage earners there was a slight decline in disposable real income or buying power. For nonworkers, mainly pension recipients, there was a slight increase in buying power, due mainly to an increase in the buying power of those on minimum pensions.

Traditional product exports showed a decline of 2.9 percent in volume while imports volume rose 3.7 percent in 1980 after showing declines in both 1978 and 1979. Since the market share loss for Norwegian industries subject to heavy competition presumably stopped in 1978 and 1979 the preliminary figures for 1980 suggest that a new decline in market shares occurred in 1980.

State Received 25 Billion in Oil Interest Revenue in 1980

Oil now plays a major role in the Norwegian economy. In 1980 the export value of oil and gas was almost the same as the value of all other products exported. The oil industry's contribution to the Norwegian GNP is about to pass that of all other industries combined. This is apparent from the Central Statistics Bureau's "Economic Outlook for 1980."

Oil activities produce enormous surpluses. In 1980 the part of the surplus exceeding current production costs and a normal yield on invested capital came to 31 billion kroner. The state's share of this so-called oil interest revenue was 25 billion kroner. The total production value of oil and gas was 43 billion kroner. Oil companies participating in the fields now in production received a share of 6 billion. This means that the companies received a surplus of 6 billion kroner in addition to the 3 billion corresponding to a normal yield on invested capital, estimated at 7 percent.

Of the total 9 billion kroner profit going to the oil companies about 3 billion went abroad in the form of interest payments and stock dividends. Due to its proprietary interests in Statoil and Norsk Hydro the state also received part of this 9 billion.

If we take into account the fact that Norway must also import some oil we can simplify things a bit and say that around 25 billion kroner of the so-called oil interest revenue can be regarded as a pure boost to the Norwegian economy from abroad. This amounted to almost 9 percent of our GNP according to the "Economic Outlook."

Domestic use of the oil revenues is a vital factor behind an employment increase of 160,000 work years in covered branches since 1974 while there has been a decline of 35,000 work years in branches subject to competition.

A strong rise in work activity on the part of women has helped substantially to increase the total labor force more than expected by the authorities. This is part of the reason why the decline for branches affected by competition has not been greater in this period. A shift in the competitive branches over to activities tied to oil has also helped check the decline in employment.

This development may have covered and postponed the need to transfer labor from competitive to protected branches. In that case we could see more shifts among branches in the years ahead, according to "Economic Outlook."

6578
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SEVERAL SECTORS OF ECONOMY FEEL BUDGET CUT EFFECTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Feb 81 p 3

(Article by Per Sjogren)

[Text] Denmark is tightening its belt. The government's economy measures are affecting large groups of people. Denmark has advanced further into the crisis than Sweden has.

Looking at the situation in Denmark may be a way of looking at our own future. Developments there may become developments here--but they don't need to.

High Interest Threatens Farmers

Mogens Christiansen is one of Denmark's 115,000 farmers. He is also one of the farmers who cannot make that activity pay its way. The reason is that he has borrowed large amounts of money at high interest rates.

His farm has been in the family for over 100 years. His father had worked it since 1920, and it had long been decided that Mogens, the youngest son, would take it over. He leased the farm beginning in 1973, and 4 years later he bought it. Now he is 30 years old and 2 million Danish kroner in debt.

The farm covers 22 Danish acres (11 hectares), and he also leases another 50 acres (25 hectares).

He had always worked with cows, and he wanted to keep it up. In 1979 he built new stables costing 600,000 kroner and spent 120,000 kroner to buy cows.

Now he has 53 cows and sells 500,000 kroner worth of milk per year. But the interest on his loan swallows up 300,000 kroner per year, and expenses have risen faster than income.

Expanded Too Fast

He says, "I went at it too fast. Right now it doesn't look as though I can get ahead of the problems, but one just has to work through them."

Mogens Christiansen's farm is in the northernmost part of Zealand. A few miles south is a farm owned by Bent Maribo, who bought it 11 years ago, when the interest rate was 7.5 percent instead of today's 19 percent. Last year he bought a neighboring farm, sold the house to someone from Copenhagen, and thus got the land free.

He owes 1 million in debt, and it is true that profits have declined. His farm is a highly streamlined swine factory.

The whole difference lies in the fact that Mogens Christiansen is newly established, while Bent Maribo had time to consolidate his operation when conditions were more favorable than they are today.

According to the central farmers organization--the Agricultural Council in Copenhagen--3,000 farmers are in immediate difficulty, and another 10,000 are in the danger zone.

Fast Price Increases

Denmark has been a member of the European Community (EC) since 1 January 1973, and its farmers sell their products at prices guaranteed by the EC. Last year Denmark's agricultural exports totaled 26 billion Danish kroner. Guaranteed prices and assured markets have caused land prices to rise quickly.

At one time that was a manageable problem for those wanting to become farmers on their own land. They could borrow money and expect that within a few years, inflation would cause the farm's value to rise so quickly that they could take out new loans.

But the price of farmland has stagnated since the start of 1980. The reason is that agricultural costs have risen faster than incomes. New farmers are not making it.

The farmers organized a protest organization in the spring of 1980, and there were demonstrations in Copenhagen, with the farmers threatening to stop deliveries. Then the government began to listen to them. In December 1980, several different measures were introduced:

The farmers obtain credit at a discount if they have large and expensive loans, if they have made large investments in recent years, or if they have increased their livestock in recent years.

Mogens Christiansen says, "But remember that those are loans and not donations. Loans have to be paid back."

He expects his problems to be solved. And he does not feel that he is a failure. Within a radius of 1 kilometer, there are people living on four other farms with the same problems.

Rising Foreign Debt, Falling Real Wages

"Stop Denmark's decline: buy Danish" is the slogan in a current campaign. After a little over 6 years of economic crisis, the decline has become a household word that is used in advertising. Pessimism has become normal.

Every improvement is now a big relief. For "Denmark, Inc.," the following results for 1980 were better than expected:

1. Exports of goods increased by a full 5 percent at constant prices.
2. At 14 billion Danish kroner, the deficit in the balance of payments was lower than expected.
3. The rate of inflation was slowed to 6 or 7 percent.
4. The interest rate fell by 2 percent, its first decline in several years.

And in one area, 1981 has also gotten off to a good start. In recent weeks the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] and employers in the private sector concluded an agreement covering the next 2 years--the first time since 1973 that it was done without government intervention.

Considering Denmark's circumstances, it was an inexpensive agreement. Including wage increases tied to the cost of living, it amounts to 7 or 8 percent per year.

It was clear to the partners in the labor market that they themselves would have to conclude an agreement if they were not to lose their credibility as partners in the labor market.

Wage Drift Prohibited

Politically, a settlement was possible because the majority of the LO's member unions realized that high nominal pay increases were meaningless. The agreements also prohibit any wage drift this year.

Minister of Economic Affairs Ivar Norgaard told DAGENS NYHETER: "We realized that we have become poorer, and we drew the conclusions from that fact."

The groups in public service have been promised an extra 3 percent by the minister of finance as compensation for having fallen behind the private sector.

All except the lowest paid public employees have suffered a drop in real wages for several years. The boundary is represented by the letter carriers and those earning an equivalent salary, whose real income has risen.

Decline in Real Wages

Real wages in the private sector fell a few percentage points last year. The decline will continue this year and next year. According to the government's long-term plan, real wages are to decline by 1 or 2 percent a year. The Danish krone was devalued by 10 percent in the fall of 1979, and the government is prepared for further devaluations if it becomes necessary.

A Danish nightmare is that there will be a big devaluation of the Swedish krona that Denmark cannot fend off with a devaluation of its own. One-fifth of Denmark's industrial exports go to Sweden.

Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen's Social Democratic minority government has 68 seats of its own out of Parliament's 179. Ten parties are represented in Parliament. The present economic policy rests on an agreement with three small parties in the center, which are terrified at the thought of disappearing from Parliament if new elections are held.

Problems This Fall

An agreement on petroleum on Denmark's continental shelf and a defense program will be guided through Parliament by the prime minister without major difficulty this spring. The problems will not start until late this fall, when it comes time for a new package for dealing with the economic crisis. That is a long-range prospect in Danish politics. So there is a measure of stability in the political instability.

That is the analysis presented by a leading opposition politician in a conversation with DAGENS NYHETER.

But:

Denmark's foreign debt is expected to rise to 115 billion Danish kroner (about 80 billion Swedish kronor) this year. The interest on foreign debt came to 10.5 billion last year, or almost as much as the amount by which industry was able to increase its exports.

Imports and exports of goods and services are expected to balance this year. But the cost of the foreign debt will rise to 13.5 billion Danish kroner.

Check Government Expenditure

The government's more long-term policy is aimed at the following:

1. First, to keep central and municipal government expenditures from simply rising automatically. They currently account for 55 percent of the GNP (the sum of goods and services). Growth is to be slowed down and is to stop altogether in the mid-1980's.
2. Private consumption is to be reduced.
3. The first goal is to keep the foreign debt from continuing to grow. But it will also be reduced.
4. The second goal, therefore, is to see investment increase. Through those combined efforts, Denmark is to achieve equilibrium around 1990.

Back to 1968 Level

The government is having success with the first part of its program. That is shown by the results for 1980. But ..using construction has fallen off so rapidly that it is now back to the same low level as at the start of the 1950's. Investment by industry is continuing to decline.

Investments in industry topped off in 1968-1969. This year they are expected to be at the same level as in 1968 at constant prices. That is no disaster, but investments

in production are close to the dangerous level at which new investments are made only to replace old equipment. The productive apparatus is ceasing to grow.

One important reason for the weak propensity to invest in industry is the low return, which stands at around 7 percent. The interest rate on short- and medium-term loans is around 19 percent. So it is now more profitable to make passive investments in bonds or notes than to invest in new production.

In order to increase investments, the government has talked about transferring money from funds and national insurance plans. There has also been talk of loans to industry at lower interest rates.

Also heard in the debate is the argument that wage earners should allow a portion of their pay to remain with the firms in the form of employee funds--in other words, a form of forced savings.

A big problem for Denmark is the fact that the country entered the postindustrial age early--10 years ago. It is a society where the public and private production of services is more important than the production of goods.

The consequence is that the productive apparatus is a couple of sizes too small for paying off the foreign debt.

Public Employees: 1.1 Million

Of the 2.5 million people in the labor market, barely 800,000 work in industry, the crafts, or construction, while 1.1 million are employed in public or private services.

The public sector added 200,000 new full-time jobs during the 1970's. Employment in industry dropped by 50,000 in 1974, but increased slowly after that. Since the start of 1980 it has been declining again.

During the 1980's, 200,000 people will enter the labor market and be looking for jobs. And since the public sector is to stop growing, this means that at least 150,000 new full-time jobs will be needed in the private labor market.

According to one estimate, that will require about 50 billion Danish kroner in investments.

That is Denmark's big problem. It will not be possible to economize the country out of the crisis. In Denmark there are healthy and sick firms existing side by side but not entire industries in crisis, as is true in Sweden. Every year 5,000 small firms die--but an equal number are born!

11798
CSO: 3109

SHIPBUILDERS PROSPER WITHOUT GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Feb 81 p 32

[Article by Bo Engzell]

[Text] Copenhagen, Friday--While most of Sweden's state-owned shipyards have almost no profitable orders on their books, the opposite is true in Denmark. The eight big Danish shipyards, which are not state-owned and receive no subsidies, have substantially improved their influx of orders (by 35 percent) in 1 year. Burmeister and Wain in Copenhagen is even at the top of the list in Europe!

The upturn for Danish yards means that some of Sweden's unemployed shipyard workers can get jobs there--quite a few in Helsingor and a smaller number in Copenhagen.

Danish shipyards oppose intervention by the government. They say that subsidies can become a cushion. Denmark has chosen a path directly opposite to that followed by Sweden and has been doing nicely following a number of cutbacks.

Eight months ago Burmeister and Wain went into bankruptcy in connection with the Jan Bonde Nielsen tangle (the Danish financial comet that fell flat as a pancake under the weight of debts totaling many hundreds of millions of Danish kroner).

Today, with new management, everything is looking up at Burmeister and Wain. The shipyard has now secured profitable orders that will carry it through 1983, and in the next few days it expects to bring in more orders that will cover a major portion of 1984.

Special Ship

Manager S. O. Lund says, "We don't dare sign any more orders now because of the foreign exchange situation. We will have to be patient for another 6 months before we sign any new contracts."

To a large extent, the secret behind Burmeister and Wain's success has to do with its successful development of a highly energy-efficient bulk carrier, which it designed with an eye to the future and also, in part, on new buying countries such as China.

Cheaper coal and more expensive oil are something that Burmeister and Wain kept in mind in its venture. Today there is a struggle on for ships that can take on coal. Burmeister and Wain caught on to the trend very early and designed its bulk carrier,

which can also carry ore and grain. With a few minor changes in design, it becomes a tanker.

The present high cost of oil--the fuel for ships--is another problem on which the design engineers are working hard. They have made more fuel-efficient engines and redesigned hulls, with a considerable saving in oil.

Manager Lund says, "When we go out to sell, we can argue that the cost of operating our ships is lower than that for ships from our competitors. The customers know what that means. We have created energy awareness at sea and reduced fuel consumption by several tons of oil per day (a couple of thousand dollars) for 300 days a year. That is important to the shipowners."

Burmeister and Wain does not custom build ships for each customer. Instead, it has gone in for a single type of vessel: a bulk carrier of 64,000 deadweight tons.

Manager Lund says, "We want to offer fuel consumption that is from 15 to 20 percent lower than that offered by our competitors. We are several years in the lead, and we intend to hold that lead. We will further reduce fuel consumption and use waste water and other things for onboard heating. That will mean even greater savings for the shipowners."

No Subsidies

Management emphasizes that Burmeister and Wain now has to work in a nontraditional manner. The future market for bulk carriers will be interesting, with razor-sharp competition. The developing countries with their special ship requirements are potential customers. What do they want, and what will be suitable for them? That is a question occupying the shipyard's financial officers and design engineers today.

Comptroller Preben Mørch-Hansen of Burmeister and Wain says, "Purely on principle, the Danish shipbuilding industry does not want any government subsidies. They can easily become a cushion and a danger as far as efficiency is concerned. Efficiency and competition with other shipyards and other countries are precisely what we must maintain if we are to get by in the future."

The only government help ever received by the Copenhagen shipyard has been a government export credit guarantee of 225 million kroner.

The winding-up procedure in connection with Burmeister and Wain's bankruptcy has not yet been completed. The firm is now an independent company with no interference from the engine factory. The shipyard is expected to pay its way this year despite cost developments. Management and the shipyard union expect profits in coming years.

Today the shipyard has 2,000 employees. The most it ever had in the past was over 3,000, and at the time of its collapse there were only 1,100.

Cooperation among Burmeister and Wain's various departments is traditionally good, and the level of occupational experience is high.

John Hansen, chairman of the shipyard workers union, says, "We have all worked hard to get the shipyard going again. It was a tough time. Many people lost their jobs.

Our own office found new jobs for 200. But now things are looking bright. We are competing with both Japan and Korea and have been able to rehire a number of skilled workers."

The union at the Kockums Shipyard in Malmö, where 1,500 jobs are to be eliminated, has contacted union representatives at Burmeister and Wain.

John Hansen says, "One really has to struggle in Sweden now that the economic situation is bad. The government takeover of Swedish shipyards was not a success. Sweden must do like we have and invest in interesting new types of ships."

There is some shock in Denmark over the fact that the Oresund Shipyard in Landskrona was shut down and that Kockums has had sharp cutbacks.

Boat of the Future

Manager S. O. Lund says, "Those are shipyards with first-rate experience. It is my opinion that special shipyards should continue to build ships instead of going in for alternative production. It is a question of our experience in mentality and method. Find a boat of the future!"

Many of the Danish shipyards--but not Burmeister and Wain--are owned by shipowners. During slumps the yards can build ships for their own shipping companies. The government has not done anything other than advance the start of some ferry construction for the State Railways at a couple of shipyards.

The Danish shipyards currently employ about 16,000 people, according to Kai Engel-Jensen, director of the Danish Shipyard Association. New orders are coming in nicely, but economic conditions can change quickly.

The head of the shipyard association says, "Burmeister and Wain has an especially fine backlog of orders, but then, they have designed a particularly interesting type of ship. Unfortunately, Sweden has had a difficult time getting through the change-over from building bigger ships to building smaller ones."

Getting a Job

There is a shortage of skilled workers at some Danish shipyards. Today, Swedish shipyard workers are finding jobs at the Helsingør Shipyard. And a few may even find work in Copenhagen.

But Sweden is exporting more than just shipyard workers.

Comptroller Mørch-Hansen says, "Swedish firms also deliver components for Burmeister and Wain's ship construction jobs."

So it is an advantage both for Swedish subcontractors and for unemployed Swedish shipyard workers that things are going well at least for Danish shipyards. Now that there is a standstill in Sweden.

11798
CSO: 3109

UGT'S SANCHIS SUMMARIZES LABOR UNION ACTIVITIES

Rome LAVORO ITALIANO in Italian 3 Feb 81 pp 32-33

[Interview with Jose A. Sanchis by Paola Elia: "A Talk With the UGT's Jose A. Sanchis"]

[Text] [Question] Will you outline for us the results of the union election that took place in Spain last week?

[Answer] The elections were a big success. Nationally, the UGT [General Union of Workers] received 29.7 percent of the vote, but the Workers Committees [CO] fell to 35.7 percent, a 4 percent drop from 1978. Our 8-point growth puts us even with the CO and marks us as one of the two unions representative of Spanish labor. But it is an even greater success when you consider we exceeded the communist union's vote, 37.86 percent.

[Question] You have spoken of only two unions, but there are others in Spain.

[Answer] True, there are, for example, autonomous unions, which are a real problem. They are due to diverse nationalities and regional autonomy in Spain, which have given rise to local unions. Also, this is the first real election held at the plant and territorial level, and the process of settling in and fence-building among the unions is just beginning. We mustn't forget that we have just emerged from Francoism, and the rightists are still strong. Besides ourselves and the CO, there is the USO [Workers Trade Union] that is a kind of "management" union and is scarcely representative of the workers. They got only 9 percent of the vote.

[Question] It seems to me that unity of action, at least, will be difficult.

[Answer] True, but not because we want a unified union or competition at all costs. Obviously, we can't talk about unity of action with the USO, because that union is hardly ready to negotiate anything. When it comes to the CO, however, we should say that while we have no intent or prospect of unity it is possible to carry on a discussion, especially on some themes of union action and in some regions, such as Madrid. In Catalonia, for example, a region where the CO is especially strong, a representative of the communist union won a seat as an alternate in the congress of the Unitary Socialist Party [PSU] and has said he wants to overcome the partisan differences that separate them in order to cooperate as a union. If the CO put into practice the democratic declarations in their platform and do not get involved in so much infighting like the Communist Party, then we will be able to make some progress together.

[Question] What have the latest union struggles in Spain been about? What issues motivate the workers? What are the country's major problems?

[Answer] In 1980 we signed a general agreement with the CEOE, which is Spain's version of Confindustria [General Confederation of Italian Industry], which defines the relationship between management and workers and the rules of collective bargaining. We got pay raises of 13 to 16 percent according to the situation in various sectors (in depressed sectors we were satisfied with 13 percent) in order to maintain buying power in the face of rising consumer prices and inflation. To a large extent, our objectives are the improvement of factory working conditions. We should mention that in Spain most workers are employed in small and medium businesses, where only 15-20 percent belong to unions. Also, we seek to defend wages, develop investment, and promote a "European" mentality among workers and management in order to move the country away from nationalism and a piecework economy, which is the stage at which our production facilities are still situated. What are the problems? Well, that's hard to say. There are a lot of them. First, there is the low level of union membership; then there's the union's lack of money, because membership dues are about 1,500 lire a person a year; third, union people lack professional training, which is due to the union's inability to set up and run a training school. But we have some plans under way with the UIL [Italian Union of Labor] in Rome, and these plans are extremely useful to us in this regard. Also, in past years when our union was ready to call in to the government (it was the social-democratic tendency), some of the members quit in protest, and now it is hard to win them back. Finally, the fragmentation of the job market is a real obstacle to our presence and to unionizing.

[Question] Let's take up the problem of wages. In Italy, we have the mechanism of wage indexation, which is supposed to protect wages and buying power from being eroded by inflation; it provides for increases every four months. Do you have anything like it?

[Answer] We don't have wage indexation, and as I know a little about your problems in this area, I should say we are not concerned with the problem of wage stabilization, etc. On the contrary, Spanish wage levels vary in a range of factors from 1 to 3. In the sectors where the union is strongest, at least 50 percent of the wages are fixed, but the rest depends on the step on the pay scale. Then too, there is a great sense of mutual responsibility and solidarity among our workers: those who earn more are ready to sacrifice for others. The highest-paying jobs are held by office workers, professional people, and civil servants, as is the case anywhere. As for keeping wages even with inflation, our mechanism works in 6-month jumps and is reviewed every year in case wages have not kept pace with inflation.

[Question] Does your union agree with Spain's entering the EEC?

[Answer] Yes, but over a long period of time. You see, Spain is a country that has no "modern" or "European" business or labor mentality. Businessmen are locked into artisanalism and the lack of a dynamic concept of industrial growth. The workers have not developed a level of awareness that would enable them to consider entry into the EEC in more than a simplistic "internationalist" light. Investment is lacking, and the CEOE attributes this lack to the cost of labor. A modern productive structure is lacking, and the CEOE justifies it by citing the problem of competition that leaves little room for maneuver and room for productive restructuring and reconversion. This structure must be changed before we enter the EEC. In the present political process, we find that the Communist Party is shrinking while the Francoist

right wing is becoming more active. This is a real mortgage on our entering the EEC.

[Question] But what are your union's plans?

[Answer] We want a union that is participatory, active, dynamic and democratic. We want more participation in government and provincial organizations to control social assistance and health care; we are for an effective presence on the Arbitration Commission, the one that is concerned with conflicts between labor and management. But we especially want to be representative. And recognized by the workers. In this respect, I think we have many affinities with the ULL.

8782

CSO: 3104

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

BRIEFS

LIBYA WANTS TURKISH WORKERS--It is reported that the Libyan Arab Peoples Socialist Jamahiriyyah wants five thousand personnel every month from Turkey to include doctors, construction engineers, electronic engineers, architects, and computer experts. In a statement by the head of Libya's Peoples Committee in Ankara, it was noted that priority will be given to Turkish workers and that the dispatch to Libya of some five thousand workers every month will be guaranteed. [Text] [Istanbul MILLI GAZETE in Turkish 9 Mar 81 p 1]

CSO: 4907

NORWEGIAN PM, DANISH SOCIAL MINISTER DISCUSS 'NORDIC MODEL'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Feb 81 p 20

[Article by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] Social Minister Ritt Bjerregaard met her Norwegian party comrade, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, in a debate on the Scandinavian social model.

If Ritt Bjerregaard feels she is being passed on the inside by Gro Harlem Brundtland's becoming the first woman prime minister in northern Europe the first public discussion between the two Social Democratic "sisters" demonstrated that it is the Danish social minister who went through the debate topics more consistently and analytically.

The scene was the Political Forum in the Workers' Community House in Oslo on Thursday evening. The participants were Ritt Bjerregaard, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and Socialist-Left vice chairman Hilde Bojer. The topic: "Is the Scandinavian social model dead?" The result was a speech by Ritt Bjerregaard which Danish opposition politicians and Social Democrats are now shuddering their way through. A Gro Harlem Brundtland speech that shows the prime minister who has not forgotten that there is an election this fall.

And it was not the fault of either Ritt Bjerregaard or Gro Harlem Brundtland that the debate was quickly sidetracked because debaters from the floor turned the whole thing into a discussion of the situation of the Lapps in Norway.

Added Attraction

The Political Forum meeting had an added attraction. It is difficult to say how many came out of curiosity, the wish to see the new woman prime minister and the hard-hitting Danish social minister and how many came out of true political interest. But members of the audience came from all age groups, even a baby, and they were attired in every possible way. Most eye-catching was a Lapp delegation in historical costume.

According to its own assertion Political Forum is a meeting place for free and critical exchanges of opinion on social issues between people with ties to left-wing parties and the labor movement.

Clear Aim

It was Ritt Bjerregaard who delivered the 45-minute speech on the Scandinavian model of society. Then Gro Harlem Brundtland and Hilde Bojer had 10 minutes each in which to comment on Ritt Bjerregaard's views and make their own remarks on the Scandinavian social model.

Malicious tongues claim that Gro Harlem Brundtland was not enthusiastic about the media event with lots of photographs and TV which the meeting was planned to be in advance. But there is no doubt that Ritt Bjerregaard was satisfied. She is good at that kind of thing.

She had worked a long time on her speech and it had a clear aim. She followed her manuscript closely and read it with the well-known Bjerregaard intonation. No room for rash statements.

As in many of her major speeches Ritt Bjerregaard had a message that sank in. Perhaps not so much among Norwegians. But of course it was intended for the Danes.

Social Security

In her elegant clothes Ritt Bjerregaard stood on the speaker's platform under a large gilt bust of one of the pioneers of the Norwegian labor movement. Here she dealt with such things as social security and habits of thought in the labor market area.

"It is quite clearly not in the interest of the labor movement to hand out subsidies to everyone and anyone for anything at all." And: "The elimination of unemployment is very closely connected with an altered concept of who should make decisions about production. This winter in Denmark we have almost a quarter of a million people who are out of work and that won't do. It is not because we can't afford it--we can quite well and we are paying a reasonably adequate compensation. It's not even the problem of having to do without the assets that could be produced by a quarter of a million of adults who want to work. We can handle that too."

Prime Minister

In her 10-minute speech Gro Harlem Brundtland did not have the same opportunities as Ritt Bjerregaard to exhaust a topic. Elegant and charming--and she certainly is attractive--she stood on the speaker's platform while Ritt Bjerregaard listened attentively. But there was no doubt that it was the prime minister who was talking. A prime minister who must try and unite the Labor Party before the election this fall.

"The right-wing wave must be fought. Conservative initiatives have been taken in both England and the United States. We must avoid similar experiments in the Nordic countries.

"The most important point in the Scandinavian social model is work for everyone. We must expand and revise the Scandinavian model without shifting the bearing beams even in periods of recession. The Scandinavian model must continue to be an inspiration both at home and abroad and an irritation for the privileged and the self-righteous."

That speech probably didn't shake up the Norwegian opposition or the various factions in the Labor Party.

But it was Gro Harlem Brundtland who as prime minister, "wife and mother" had to sit through the evening and deal with the more or less simplistic speeches about the conflict between the Lapps and Norwegian authorities.

Afterward Gro Harlem Brundtland and Ritt Bjerregaard went on to a small social gathering. Here they could talk more about women in politics. If they felt like it. That was the question most frequently directed by journalists at the two "Scandinavian sisters" at their meetings during the day.

6578
CSO: 8113/0780

EDITORIAL CONSIDERS PRESIDENT 'POLITICALLY INCAPABLE'

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 24 Feb 81 p 1

[Text] President Kyprianou's political inability has proven dangerous for the country. His political unworthiness has proven disastrous. But here begins, not ends, his irresponsible presence in the country's political life. In his time, political crime is a specter; political pandering is rife. His journalistic organ and governmental representatives have been enlisted to debase the last traces of this republic's dignity.

In Paphos, a KYP [Central Intelligence Service] sergeant went to a political demonstration. He pulled out a pistol. A senior police officer disarmed him by force. This all occurred in view of nearly the entire Paphos police force and five thousand people. The police leadership and the Ministry of Interior have had the facts since the night of 22 February. They kept silent. After 48 hours of pregnancy, the abortive child was born--the official announcement, which will remain in Cyprus the most vandalic butchering of clear facts.

But the government did not confine itself to this. The presidential newspaper revealed the government's desperate attempt to confuse the crime, to falsify facts a posteriori. The government and its president are leading the country on roads of the past. The things they are machinating are very uncouth and dangerous. Their unworthiness and inability to tame the forces which they let loose are patent. They are not concealing, they are not obfuscating simply a red-handed crime. They are proceeding where the most galloping stupidity would not dare to head: They are using an excessive dose of political ignominy.

The responsibilities of the police chief and the minister of interior are very heavy. The police avoided issuing an announcement. Why? Because the police did not give the facts? Because the minister of interior did not take charge of the case? Because 48 hours passed before the concoction of Miltiadis Christodoulou's lie was enlisted for a miserable announcement?

The people are now asking more intensely: Who organized the episode? The question would not proceed so decisively and imperatively if the presidential newspaper had not reported with its frivolity the president's intentions....Now the question is hot. Now they have--in their foolish effort to obscure facts--created an issue of colossal dimensions. The House escapes, but before it escapes, it must officially inform the people of what happened in Paphos. If the presidential intention is for the people to be intimidated, for the people to be deceived, for the people to be politically panic-stricken, it is committing its final fatal mistake....His newspaper is crucifying him!

This country literally writhed under the wounds of multiple illegalities. Now the past becomes a specter. The government and president, instead of immediately applying the law, tried with omissions and their journalistic organ to be profigate factiously, to reverse facts with a vomitive irresponsibility. The people are right to tremble for the future. With such an irresponsible government, such a presidential policy and legal absurdity and such a disgusting journalistic disgracefulness, the country is being led to extremely corrupt and black days.

9247
CSO: 4908

DURDURAN LIKENS DENKTAS TO HITLER

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 11 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] During a speech in which he said that there is no freedom to criticize in the TPSC, Turkish Communal Party (TCP) Chairman Alpay Durduran blasted President Denktas and drew similarities between Denktas and Hitler. Noting that the German people were silenced when Hitler embarked on his Eastern Offensive, Durduran said, "Had the silenced people on the eve of that momentous decision been given the freedom to criticize, thereby weakening Hitler's position, millions might not have perished."

The TCP Chairman asserted that the President is unable to respond to criticisms because no response is possible. Durduran stated that Denktas answers by hurling some irrelevant accusations and slurs at him. He continued, "On Bayrak Radio-Television only one name is mentioned in Cypriot history. One or two figures are irreproachable. In other words, even when that person is not speaking, there are many who speak for him. And there are censors willing to ensure that critical voices are silenced as soon as they appear."

Durduran, who maintained that President Denktas has become estranged from his party and is out of touch, stated that the President is meddling in daily domestic and foreign policies and that he has so fouled matters as to set off intra-party conflicts.

CSO: 4907

HESSE'S BOERNER ON SPD'S LOCAL, NATIONAL PROBLEMS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 9 Mar 81 pp 81-93

Interview with Hesse Minister-President Holger Boerner, at the Hesse State Legislature, by SPIEGEL editors Jochen Boelsche and Hans Werner Kils: "You Can Get Away with That in the South Seas" — Hesse Minister-President Holger Boerner on the Crisis in the SPD"; date of interview not given/

Text SPIEGEL: Four and a half years ago when you entered office, you were celebrated as a friend in need from Bonn, as the man who promised to rehabilitate in Hesse a party and government plagued by scandals and ugly situations. Today Hesse's SPD/FDP coalition — the last socialist/liberal state government in West Germany — is again in nearly as bad a state as it was in 1976. Does the fault lie with Holger Boerner or with Bonn?

Boerner: I can't agree with your analysis. The socialist/liberal coalition's energy policy and its decisions on expanding Frankfurt airport in particular have made clear that it is tackling problems of the future, and it has met with approval on this even among the opposition in the state legislature....

SPIEGEL: ...which, however, has been withheld by many of your fellow party members. The Southern Hesse SPD District — its 100,000 members make it the second largest party district in the Federal Republic — refused by a two-thirds majority to support your airport expansion plans.

Boerner: Party conferences record the mood of the moment among the delegates. They are not necessarily identical with the basic needs of the voters and their views. And I willingly concede that the SPD is ill-prepared for the apportionment battles that our society is now experiencing in the aftermath of the second oil crisis. The SPD is thrashing out a lot of conflicts that other parties are still keeping under wraps or have not even confronted.

SPIEGEL: The Social Democrats' internal disputes have led your interior minister, FDP State Chairman Ekkehard Gries, to attest to an "abominable picture" of the SPD in Bonn as well as "here."

Boerner: This remark has to be viewed against the backdrop of the liberals' own problems, and of course also the upcoming local election campaign. The politicians' old precept is being applied here: Every salesman praises his own wares and knocks the others.

SPIEGEL: Even Social Democrats like your Duesseldorf colleague, Johannes Rau, are talking about a "decline in voter approval of the SPD that must be termed dramatic."

Boerner: Johannes Rau's analysis has to be viewed in the context of events which did not originate in Hesse and whose causes do not lie with Hesse.

SPIEGEL: But we have results of polls from Hesse — just before the local elections on 22 March — which make it appear possible that the SPD will get less than 40 percent and the FDP more than 10 percent; the CDU is approaching an absolute majority.

Boerner: If the SPD succeeds in getting its own voters to the ballot box, it can come out of the local elections with a good result.

SPIEGEL: A poor showing there would undoubtedly strengthen the inclination of the Free Democrats to switch coalition partners at the state level. FDP State Chairman Gries has already warned his party that it must not let itself "be infected" by the condition of the Social Democrats.

Boerner: State policy has not been affected by this. There hasn't been a single serious row in this coalition since I've been in Hesse. There isn't any item of state policy that might have separated us; rather, we have moved toward each other in the course of lengthy discussions.

SPIEGEL: You and your party have apparently moved away from one another during this time. Many Social Democrats are refusing you their allegiance.

Boerner: A politician who hasn't suffered any defeats isn't capable of leadership. I suffered a defeat at a party conference and gained a broad majority in the state legislature in exchange — over the same problem, the runway. The main thing as far as I'm concerned is that I know I'm of one mind with the big trade unions on both energy policy and the runway issue....

SPIEGEL: ...which, in turn, agree with the employer organizations on these matters.

Boerner: The situation in Hesse would be precarious for me only if the unions had the impression that my mind was closed to their concerns and that I no longer had an appropriate policy. If a party conference whose makeup is a random affair comes to conclusions that differ from mine, then I have to put up with that.

SPIEGEL: On the runway issue you have against you not only the leftists whom you scorn with a vengeance....

Boerner: Well, your categorizations don't interest me at all. I've never let myself be pigeonholed like that, not as federal business manager nor as minister-president or state chairman. And I'm not scornful of anyone in the SPD, certainly not the leftists. Of course, I consider the ecological movement basically conservative, not leftist. Something is developing here in the SPD which basically has nothing to do with socialism, but rather ends up as egoism tinged with moralism.

SPIEGEL: Standing against you on the runway construction in addition to The Greens in the SPD are also faithful Social Democrats like Martin Berg, the candidate for lord mayor of Frankfurt....

Boerner: ...who I therefore hope wins a convincing victory on 22 March....

SPIEGEL: ...and many Social Democratic state officials, mayors and district legislators who accuse you of "despotic obstinacy" and "arrogance" and call you "the house tyrant," "landgrave" and "ayatollah."

Boerner: It isn't the Hesse mayors as such; it's the mayors of the communities affected. I'm not scornful of these people either. Quite the contrary: I respect them because they are subjectively doing what they promised their constituents — namely, fighting against additional nuisances that this airport involves. But for the sake of the future of a state with 5.4 million inhabitants, I have to expect the 20,000 people who are affected to make some sacrifices. I'm not saying it's easy to get used to the noise of aircraft. But in an industrial environment it is simply impossible to exist without such things. That's why I argue with the people who act as though life consists only of ecology. You can get away with that on an island in the South seas, but not in the middle of the Federal Republic.

SPIEGEL: You can argue the other way around, too. Fresh air, clean water and countryside in its natural state are in shorter supply in the Rhine-Main area than anywhere else. Is it so inappropriate to let ecology take precedence over the economy once in a while, especially right here?

Boerner: That's desirable in principle. But in practical terms the decision was between 30,000 jobs and the felling of 200 hectares of trees. The fact that here in Frankfurt we put more than 70 percent of the total amount of German freight into the air shows how very dependent industry in Hesse and the Rhineland-Palatinate is on this airport.

SPIEGEL: When you argue that way, your adversaries see it as confirmation of their opinion that the former skilled concrete worker Boerner now regards all of Hesse as his construction site, that he equates concrete with progress and is still inspired by the growth credo of the 1960's and '70's.

Boerner: On the contrary. I'm a much more reflective person than the one you've just sketched. I also see that particularly the southern Hesse region — which could be described as the California of the Federal Republic over the past 20 years — has suffered from gold fever. Many a horror of construction policy has been perpetuated there. The haphazard development of the countryside is something for which the SPD mayors who are now fighting the runway have to take some of the blame.

SPIEGEL: One of your justifications of the need for runway 18-West is that the Federal Republic of Germany must continue to be "open to the world" and "able to survive." Isn't that just a bit overblown?

Boerner: No. I worked on air transport policy for 5 years as a state secretary in Bonn. I know what I'm saying when I talk about the connection between trade policy, air transport and economic growth. If you have an excavator sitting around the Suez Canal not making any money, but costing you some because you have to wait 4 weeks for a spare part, in the future you'll think twice about buying any more machinery in Germany.

SPIEGEL: Not even the experts agree on whether the controversial runway is really necessary. There/forecasts that predict an annual increase of only 0.6 percent for flight operations. Can't this increase be taken care of by expanding taxiways on existing takeoff and landing strips?

Boerner: Other experts are talking about from 6 to 14 percent. But it's not a matter of the percentage of increase; the decisive question is how the traffic we have now, without any increase, is to be handled in 3 or 5 years if the use of more jumbos and more DC-10's make it necessary to increase intervals between aircraft for reasons of safety. The decision wasn't an easy one for me to make. I could have saved myself a lot of aggravation if there had been a way to handle the traffic with the existing parallel-runway system.

SPIEGEL: You're also getting some aggravation as a result of your energy policy. The SPD decided at its party conference in Berlin that atomic power plants should serve only as stopgaps, "to cover residual demand." You, on the other hand, are forcing a third atomic reactor in Biblis, even though one of the world's largest nuclear complexes is already located there and 60 percent of the electricity needed in Hesse is derived from nuclear power plants.

Boerner: We didn't become builders of atomic power plants just for fun, you know; we did it because our state's industry needed inexpensive electricity. It isn't just since the last party conference that I've been an advocate of nuclear power. I of course submitted to the Berlin compromise on energy policy, even though my own ideas were more far-reaching. In other words, to my mind it would have been better to build up our nuclear energy effort even more.

SPIEGEL: The compromise to which you agreed provides the possibility of one day being able to get out of the atomic policy business.

Boerner: Given the present economic situation, I see no way to use such an option effectively. I can't heat our state's economy with party conference resolutions; I have to be concerned with cheap electricity.

SPIEGEL: The "fact of resolution: and political action going their separate ways" was recently the reason why Klaus Matthiesen in Kiel stepped down as a candidate for the office of minister-president. In his view it is a "dilemma of Social-Democratic politics" that his ruling colleagues continue to pursue their course without regard for party conference compromises, allowing for no change of objective — contrary to the spirit of their own program, if necessary.

Boerner: I'm not going to make a value judgment on SPD politics in Schleswig-Holstein. If you ask whether I'm risking a break with the party and its resolutions, I can only say this: Up to now, everything I've brought to a vote in the state legislature has been covered by the election platform and my government message of 1978. Besides, anyone who thinks my policies are wrong can vote for Alfred Dregger.

SPIEGEL: To get back to the binding nature of party conference resolutions. Does coal still take precedence in Hesse?

Boerner: I am vehemently in favor of a combination of energy conservation, the use of coal and nuclear power. But I regard as a very great risk over the long term the changes described by some scientists in the earth's climate, changes brought about by the burning of fossil fuels. Nuclear energy is cleaner. Moreover, I would caution against believing that endless amounts of coal are available. It would consequently constitute negligence if there should be people in German politics today who would make energy policy on the basis of imported coal. Therefore....

SPIEGEL: ...you would rather rely on imported uranium.

Boerner: With reprocessing, we have enough uranium to last at least to the year 2000. I think it's definitely sensible to use it. That's why I also want a reprocessing plant.

SPIEGEL: You're proving your critics within the party to be right — former nuclear manager Klaus Traube, for instance, an SPD delegate from Frankfurt. Traube is afraid that compulsive forces are being unleashed in Hesse which will speed the way to the fast-breeder reactor; and this would "lay bare the greatest danger of all: plutonium, the sword of Damocles." Are such worries about safety really so far-fetched in a state whose government can't even get the toxic wastes of the Hoechst company under control?

Boerner: As you know, we've tightened up on our environmental protection and forced the Hoechst company to invest hundreds of millions on this. Anyone who has studied the problem a bit more closely knows that not everything can be done in 3 weeks. Different safety standards have been imposed on nuclear energy from the very beginning. The compulsive forces that Klaus Traube maintains exist are disputed by people who have at least as much expertise as he has.

SPIEGEL: You want to present Hesse with a reprocessing plant after your colleague in Lower Saxony, Albrecht, passed it up because he didn't want "a civil war" in his state. Do you want to risk civil war in Hesse?

Boerner: It is a historic failing when Albrecht has this to say as a head of government: "There are things I think are right, but I can't put them through." Besides, the Hesse installation that we're studying — and it's by no means certain whether it can ever be built — is supposed to be a demonstration plant designed to help us make a general decision in the mid-1980's.

SPIEGEL: That doesn't change the fact that the opponents of nuclear power in your party view this installation as a "Gorleben blueprint" and are predicting a "Gorleben climate" for Hesse. If you have to, do you intend to use Hesse's policemen against Young Socialists and other colleagues?

Boerner: I favor the right to demonstrate, but I'm even more in favor of persuasion. That's why I won't discuss such hypothetical situations today, 5 years before any possible start on construction. I'm basing my policy on the more than 60 percent of Hesse's population that has been saying yes to nuclear power for years. Therefore I can't fall back on the opinion of a vocal minority when basic decisions for our state are at issue.

SPIEGEL: It may be that one or another member of this minority is better informed than the average citizen as to the risks involved in using nuclear power. Isn't the state government making light of the dangers from the plutonium industry when your Minister Karry says that a reprocessing plant is a "perfectly normal chemical factory"?

Boerner: I've never engaged in this discussion along those lines. I've always said that any energy policy entails risks.

SPIEGEL: The risks from your nuclear power policy will certainly increase if your Minister of Economics Karry has his way. While you, Herr Boerner, publicly assert that there will be "no concession" when it comes to matters of safety....

Boerner: And that's the way it's going to stay.

SPIEGEL: ...Herr Karry is sending letters to his FDP ministerial colleagues in Bonn in which he complains of the safety standards required of Hesse's nuclear industry that are allegedly too exacting, regulations that would adversely affect the industry's "productive power and ability to compete internationally."

Boerner: I don't want to comment on this letter.

SPIEGEL: Why not?

Boerner: I can only say that atomic law is federal law. And Hesse doesn't have its own interpretation of safety; we have the clear standards fixed in the atomic energy law.

SPIEGEL: Then why these letters?

Boerner: Ask Herr Karry himself. I'm sure he'll give you an interpretation.

SPIEGEL: You have said yourself that you make atomic policy out of a sense of "national responsibility," but also to prevent a "stab-in-the-back legend from the conservatives"; it mustn't happen that the SPD can one day be held responsible for energy shortages. Don't phrases like this express once again the historical trauma of the Social Democrats of being described as "men without a country" — a fear which, as you can see from the decree on radicals, is being overcompensated for by accommodation with the conservative world view?

Boerner: No, no. That cliche is absolutely false. Let me say quite clearly that the SPD would be done for if it were to be regarded by the public as only a fair-weather party. The SPD must prove itself especially right now, at a time when resources are getting scarcer and jobs are in jeopardy. But I do say this: Yes indeed, I do have a trauma — if you want to call it that — namely, that mass unemployment could make this German democracy the prey of political patent medicine salesmen. I see the danger of there being Greens who have a political philosophy that has an explanation for everything and then ultimately ends up as fascism.

SPIEGEL: In turn, job security at any price also involves political risks. Your party colleague Professor Parthmann, labor minister in Duesseldorf, speaks of a "breakdown of moral values" when, for the sake of jobs, a government led by the

SPD permits tanks to be delivered to the Middle East and submarines to Chile, where — as your fellow party member Mattheofer says — a "gang of murderers" is in power. Don't you have to draw the line somewhere as regards job security?

Boerner: Of course you do. In the matter of Chile I feel very closely allied with Parthmann and Mattheofer, and also the young people who are protesting. I oppose a policy that would be based on job-related arguments in favor of weapons exports to the Third World or to areas of tension. Submarines for Chile have a symbolic meaning.

SPIEGEL: And the tanks for the Saudis?

Boerner: The rule for other arms deals that enter into discussion is that we Germans have for a long time not been able to do what others do. And I don't want us to do such things. We aren't a great power, and we don't want to be.

SPIEGEL: You can count on applause from the SPD's younger set on this point. Otherwise, however, you and your nuclear and airport policies seem to be making the rift between the young voters and the SPD even wider, and continuing to choke off the flow of young people to your party and to the Young Socialists.

Boerner: Young people are no longer attracted by what the Young Socialists are discussing today. I'm very sorry, and I regret to say that the Young Socialists have become an association of officers without troops. Academic discussions that go around in circles, like the ones they've been having for years, have no attraction for skilled workers. Is it not a matter of course that you take your examinations, that you do a good job of it and that you not only take advantage of rights but also fulfill your obligations within the community?

SPIEGEL: Doesn't it turn young people off when the SPD treats critics within the party the way Karl-Heinz Hansen was treated — the one whom some laborers threatened to hit over the head with a chair leg?

Boerner: Well, if Hansen is styled as a youth leader, then I have to laugh.

SPIEGEL: For a long time you've been as rough on teachers as you have on the Young Socialists; you charge them with having a job mentality and laziness. It is the opinion of the Education and Science Union that with remarks like this you have "defamed 44,000 servants of the state" and "abandoned the base of Social-Democratic educational policy."

Boerner: That last part is pure rubbish. The one who made that up doesn't believe it himself. I'm critical of the leftist teachers. Besides, I haven't had it in for teachers as such.

SPIEGEL: But a lot of them have apparently felt that you were talking about them.

Boerner: Thank goodness! Just to state my position on this: I'm against thinking of educational reform as merely pay reform. Because of the job mentality of a few, the terrific vision of a better, more equitable school is in danger of being buried in discussions of job classifications.

SPIEGEL: What kind of vision do you have?

Boerner: Without being a believer in anthroposophy, I'm a proponent of the Waldorf school of pedagogy, or the unity of intellectual and manual training. That's my approach.

SPIEGEL: But for that you'd probably first have to hire more teachers instead of letting some go.

Boerner: If the situation here were what it is in Denmark, where the public school teacher earns as much and counts for as much as a skilled worker, then today in Hesse I could hire all the young people coming out of the university and wouldn't have a teacher shortage at all.

SPIEGEL: Holger Boerner proclaims the cultural revolution.

Boerner: Sure, if you want to call it that; it is a bit of culture revolution.

SPIEGEL: You seem to want to turn the whole public service system inside out. When your justice minister in the cabinet asks you for new judgeships, you tell him it would be a better idea to have time clocks installed at the courthouses.

Boerner: I don't want to comment on the judges just yet. By the way, I oppose the professional civil service in its present form. I could at least picture all teachers becoming employees of the system. Then we would have wage contracts and wage fights, and the whole affair would be regulated.

SPIEGEL: You're always referring to your good relationship with the unions, but you won't get approval for such plans from either the OeTV [Public Service, Transportation and Communications] union or the GFW [Education and Science Trade Union].

Boerner: You're right, but I will from the Metalworkers Union and the Construction, Masonry and Excavation Workers Union and half a dozen other unions that produce the net national product from which the public service people make their living.

SPIEGEL: But even within the Hesse SPD, which appears to many to be a career party for public servants, you won't find any party conference majorities for your cultural-revolutionary ideas. After all, teachers, students and personnel managers are greatly over-represented among the delegates.

Boerner: That's why I tell them this sometimes at party conferences: You don't constitute the base, and I'm executing the policy that I promised to our voters. I still live in Kassel, right among our voters, and I know what the little guy's problems are. That's where I'm investing my political capital — and I'll continue to do so.

SPIEGEL: So won't more policy favoring the little guy be made at SPD party conferences — by those delegates whom you like to call "great minds with two left hands"?

Boerner: I wouldn't put it that way. It's accurate to say that SPD party conferences today are not always identical with the sociological makeup of the Metalworkers Union Congress.

SPIEGEL: Would you prefer that?

Boerner: It isn't a question of what I would prefer. The SPD of today is a more complicated party than it was 10 or 20 or 30 years ago. But it was to be expected that the Godesberg liberalization would address segments of the population which would not identify either in their thinking or their material interests with the skilled worker class — the core of the SPD electorate. I don't want to go back to the way things were 20 years ago. But it has become more of an effort, if you will, to obtain majorities in the SPD.

SPIEGEL: Isn't the crisis in the SPD mainly a result of the fact that, as Erhard Eppler says, right now there is "no single major issue" that "could integrate the party and set it apart from the CDU"?

Boerner: Eppler is wrong there. He has never been a minister-president and has never had to take responsibility for jobs. What integrates the party is its concern over jobs, concern over the weak in our society. And that's why I'm quite certain that the Social Democrats will draw closer together in the next few months — not only in Hesse but beyond as well.

SPIEGEL: You sometimes seem like an outsider at SPD party conferences....

Boerner: That makes me laugh. Outsiders don't get elected by such majorities.

SPIEGEL: ...while at FDP party conferences you would get a clear majority for many an idea of yours. At any rate, many of your fellow party members think you acquiesce too easily to FDP demands in the cabinet.

Boerner: The coalition's program isn't an FDP program, and it isn't an SPD program; it's a compromise, but one in which the Social Democrats can recognize themselves again. For instance, the fact that there is no longer a city of Lahn and that Wetzlar is Wetzlar again and Giessen, Giessen again — I got this change in regional reform out of my coalition partner as well, not just my own party.

SPIEGEL: Nevertheless, uppermost in the mind of the party is the impression that FDP wishes are your command, while by your own admission you see in SPD resolutions "only suggestions, nothing more."

Boerner: I can't stop you from sucking on your prejudices like other people suck on cough drops.

SPIEGEL: All the same, Willi Goerlach, chairman of the powerful Southern Hesse SPD District is complaining that "the tail is wagging the dog" in the Wiesbaden coalition.

Boerner: Speak for yourself: Does one of us look like a tail?

SPIEGEL: Not really, Herr Minister-President.

7458

CSO: 3103

SPD TRYING TO BUILD UP CONTACTS WITH COUNTERCULTURE

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Feb 81 pp 39-46

[Text] They set up tenants' unions and cooperatives, staged plays and hardened their bodies in their own clubs. They made the next generation try out democracy in children's republics and cared for the socially disadvantaged in welfare organizations--the social democrats at the beginning of the century.

They build heat pumps and wind dynamos, fill teeth in cooperative dental practices, they look after single old people, they fix up empty houses, help drug addicts to kick the habit, administer their own credit union--members of the counterculture, 80 years later.

But beyond the common point of departure there is little to unite socialists and the counterculture. For most Social Democrats the new counterculture is just a daydream, their withdrawal from traditional politics is a "bourgeois-romantic answer to the crisis of our industrial age" (Klaus Matthiesen, head of the Schleswig-Holstein SPD faction). The average socialist has more understanding for the worker's son from Gelsenkirchen, who commutes to the University of Bochum every day, than for the industrialist's daughter who serves beer in a women's bar in Berlin-Kreuzberg.

Thomas Krueger, a Berlin counterculture member, describes what, in turn, young people think about SPD politics: "A new youth center cannot console the unemployed high school graduates for the hopelessness of their situation, the newest university reforms cannot give the students meaningful prospects, a new hospital cannot cure the increasing stress created by the high-efficiency job, a renovated city district cannot prevent increasing isolation." Krueger concluded that members of the counterculture found the SPD "boring."

The designated leader of the SPD in the Bundestag, Peter Glotz, commented: "It's as if the Chinese were supposed to communicate with the Japanese." Gradually, attempts to interpret are beginning. The socialists have been trying for some months to bridge the gulf. Ministers invite counterculture members to their offices for discussions, party officials discuss the movement in platform committees, members of parliament visit communes and workers' collectives in the tenements and back courtyards of Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne.

The Social Democrats have recognized that in the counterculture milieu 200,000 people are now practicing what was not always alien to the party: searching for

new ways of life, solidarity without bureaucratic obstruction--for example, when the "Factory for Culture, Sports and Trades" tries out new teaching styles in a private school for primary school children run by parents, the "nonprofit-oriented" Berlin taxi collective NeTaKo tries codetermination on a small scale, or the "Aggressive Aging" group looks after women senior citizens.

Johano Strasser, a member of the SPD commission on basic values, said: "We need contact with these groups in order to think about our concept of progress." The mayor of Hamburg, Hans-Ulrich Klose, is helping: "We can learn from the counter-culture groups."

The Social Democrats are driven not only by feelings of sympathy for the counter-culture, but also by concern for the next generation of the left. The alternative movement, decided leftwing SPD Bundestag delegate Karsten Voigt in 1979, was too small to be able to form parliamentary majorities, but: "It is large enough to be able to block for a long time the formation of a parliamentary majority under the leadership of the SPD."

The Berlin senator for science at the time, Peter Glotz, said in the same year: It was a "mortal danger" if between 3 and 5 percent of the potential left "dropped out permanently," and if 20 to 30 percent of the young generation became used to voting "alternative" or to not voting at all.

In an analysis of the elections for the house of delegates in March 1979, in which the Alternative List received 3.7 percent, the Social Democrats in Berlin saw the "foundation of social democracy's existence" threatened by the new competition.

The problem has not disappeared, even after the collapse among the Greens. In the Bundestag elections in October last year, 48.9 percent of young and first-time voters voted for the socialists, but only, according to the new parliamentary secretary of state in the Ministry of Education, Erich Kuehlwein, "with a clenched fist."

Bernd Schoppe, an expert in the SPD central office, said: "The high proportion of young peoples' votes for the SPD is evidence of rejecting Strauss rather than of a young person's strong political orientation toward the SPD."

According to the most recent findings in the Erich Ollenhauer House, about 8 percent of those between 18 and 25 would not vote for any of the established parties at the moment. One SPD strategist said that the problem is "confronting us in massive proportions," primarily in the city states of Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin.

Opinion pollsters discovered that the Alternative List vote could reach 13 percent in the Berlin election on 10 May--and thus it would be the third force in parliament, as a coalition partner of the established parties or as the opposition party which will force a Grand Coalition of the party establishment.

The socialists have already disbursed themselves of one hope: The young people who have drifted away cannot be won back to the party in just a short time. Schoppe says: "It is not on the agenda to convince young people of the rightness

of social democratic positions--that method went out a long time ago." First of all the Social Democrats would have to try to reopen discussions with young people.

In order to remove his fellow socialists' timidity, Strasser creates "publicity for the counterculture" in his lectures to local clubs and cooperatives. The left-wing party theoretician also tries to bring young people from this sub-milieu and socialists closer together at seminars at the pro-SPD Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Minister for Education Bjoern Engholm is trying another route. While he was still parliamentary secretary of state he offered to support "educationally relevant" projects from the counterculture with DM 200,000 from his budget--in order to make possible a "tentative sniffing out of each other's position" "without political ulterior motives or conditions."

Through counterculture experts like former SDS member Bernd Rabehl and political scientist Ulman Fischer, officials in the ministries were able to communicate with the milieu and persuade a few counterculturists, in strict secrecy, to attend a meeting in the Oberursel youth center. Among those who came were: the Workers' Self Help from Frankfurt, an artisans' business run by people formerly unemployed, the Finkenhof Sheep Farmers Cooperative, the Autonomous Education Center (AEC) from Hamburg, which specializes in seminars for young people.

But the discussion produced no results: Those from Bonn sat on their money, the other discussants refused to cooperate. Their fear of being corrupted by "state bread" (counterculture slang) was too great. The ministry, according to the Hamburg AEC, only wanted to "reintegrate youth more solidly into this social system." Besides, "a chunk of money like that would only create unrest to the point of discord."

Since then there has been some indication of a change of heart. The "Factory" accepted DM 100,000 from the Berlin Senat and the same amount in credit to develop a heat pump jointly with the Technical University. A task force for the "Financing of Alternative Projects" proposed in Berlin that the movement would have to "join the fight for tax money--while at the same time preserving its autonomy."

Among those who intend to fight are social organizations like the Drug Addicts' Counseling Group, the Kreuzberg Jobless Shop, the Counseling Center for Homosexuals and Lesbians, the District Shop "Tall Dwarf," and also political associations like the cooperative "Citizens Watch the Police" or the "Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy."

Their justification is that they are performing their "socially meaningful work" at present in conditions which can "scarcely be tolerated, or tolerated with great difficulty, over a longer period, personally, professionally and politically." Frequently they lack even the bare necessities, for rent and postage. If the situation does not change, in the opinion of the task force, there is a risk that the counterculture in Berlin would degenerate into "a zoo program" for tourists "in their glass-enclosed buses."

One supporter of state money is Peter Grottian, Berlin social scientist, and member of the "Self Help Network," a fund for assisting alternative projects

(SPIEGEL 40/1980). According to his thesis, if the Social Democrats supported programs on a larger scale, they could perform better and more effective social work in the Laender they control.

Such a suggestion is not that improbable. The counterculturists have opened up sectors in which state workers are by and large powerless. One example: While social inspectors can take action against child-beating parents only with a summons or by withdrawing their right to care for the child, the Berlin Center for Child Protection tries to help, using extreme discretion, with counseling and therapy.

But even the conditions for financial aid to alternative projects have not been clarified. The state must examine for budgetary reasons whether the money is being spent sensibly, some groups on the other hand, concerned about their independence, prefer to accept without any requirements.

They already have one supporter in the SPD ranks: the chairman of the Young Socialists, Willi Piecyk: "We should pay for the music, but let the people play." In this way the SPD could prove that it is serious about its wish for a dialogue.

SPD expert Bernd Schoppe is also concerned about the party's credibility. He is asking that in future elected representatives appear more often at youth centers and talk more with young people.

Officials should bring up topics more often that affect young people particularly, such as environmental protection, and policies on peace and disarmament.

In this regard the socialists have bad cards at the moment.

9581
CSO: 3103

BRIEFS

MP: USSR BEHIND PEACE GROUP--Helsinki--DAGENS NYHETER has learned that Member of Parliament Pentti Maki-Hakola of the Conservative Party will be punished by his party's parliamentary group when Parliament reconvenes next month. Maki-Hakola, who is known for his conservative opinions, spoke during last fall's budget debate in opposition to an appropriation for the organization known as the Peace Fighters, which he said was a communist organization. Maki-Hakola's statement created an awkward stir among many of his fellow members in the group, who felt that his speech might damage the party's relations with the East and hinder its chances of being part of a coalition government. The Peace Fighters are a part of the World Peace Council, where the Soviet Union's influence is strong. Pentti Sillantaus, the Conservative Party's group chairman, recently contacted Maki-Hakola to advise him that he would lose his seat on Parliament's Appropriations Committee, one of whose responsibilities is the national budget. Maki-Hakola will also be moved from the prominent seat he now occupies to a spot farther back in the chamber. Maki-Hakola feels that he is being punished for stating his opinions in the budget debate. The Conservative Party is endeavoring to be a part of the government. So far President Kekkonen has kept the party out of the government, partly for foreign policy reasons. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Jan 81 p 44] 11798

CSO: 3109

JOSPIN: SOCIALIST VIEWPOINT ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French 1980 - 1981 pp 203-211

[Interview with Lionel Jospin, French Socialist Party national secretary for international relations, Paris alderman since March 1977, and professor of economics at the Sceaux IUT [University Institute of Technology], by Carole Pillon; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Mister Jospin, on several occasions these past few weeks, the Socialist Party has said it favored renegotiation of the fundamental principles of the Atlantic Alliance. What fault do you find with the Alliance's present structure?

[Answer] Today, we no longer exactly know what the Atlantic Alliance really is, what its geographical boundaries are, what nature of its members' mutual obligations are, and what degree of automaticity those obligations have. A certain number of developments are most pronounced. These include:

- a. NATO's reorganization on the Mediterranean's northern shore with reinforcement of the NATO presence in Turkey after the coup there, Greece's partial reintegration, and the Spanish Government's commitment to join the Alliance;
- b. Attempts to redeploy NATO forces in the Middle East and Indian Ocean outside the Alliance's normal area of operations;
- c. A willingness to shift from military solidarity to economic solidarity despite --or because of--the vexations of the economic crisis.

Furthermore, the stationing of new types of miniaturized nuclear weapons alters the military strategy based on deterrence. Acceptance of the territorial "sanctuarization" concept seems to be waning. Because of all these developments, the current status of the balance of forces in Europe must be clearly defined if we wish to lay the foundations for halting the arms race.

[Question] In your view, does this reexamination of the Alliance's fundamental principles involve reappraisal of the validity of transatlantic solidarity?

[Answer] It is essential--as Francois Mitterrand has clearly explained--that each member of the Atlantic Alliance state in no uncertain terms what it commits itself to do and what it refuses to do. As for us, we demand the right of independent decision-making for France, and we reject any principle of automatic response the terms and conditions of which have not been explicitly defined beforehand.

In any case, our ultimate goal continues to be gradual and simultaneous dissolution of military blocs. To achieve that goal, we must maintain our own capacity to negotiate within the Atlantic Alliance and with member countries of the Warsaw Pact.

[Question] What do you think of the policy of East-West detente?

[Answer] Detente must be preserved, or reestablished. Detente is not peace, but it may lead to peace. Consequently an effort must be made to restore a certain degree of trust among partners. The invasion of Afghanistan, the deployment of SS-20 missiles, and the continued prosecution of dissidents are all cases of the Soviet Union's failure to live up to its commitments to detente. But it must be admitted that the U. S. Senate's failure to ratify the SALT II agreements, the increase in militaristic statements in the West--even before the invasion of Afghanistan--and, the decision to station Pershing and cruise missiles--without having exhausted all ways and means of negotiation--also contribute to the deterioration of East-West relations.

In our view, there is a parallel trend in the United States and the Soviet Union toward reviving a policy of blocs to cope not only with crises confronting each of these powers within its own sphere of influence but also with the emergence of a more diversified world. We must fight against this twofold trend. And because the trend is more pronounced, and with particular brutality especially in the military sphere, within the USSR, the priority today is to express rejection of that country's policy.

[Question] Do you feel that the dialogue with the East must, nevertheless, be maintained regardless of circumstances?

[Answer] We view continuation of the dialogue with the East as necessary and useful. There are times, however, when we must be able to reject the unacceptable. The invasion of Afghanistan is unacceptable. Intervention in Poland would likewise be unacceptable. Preservation of detente also requires firmness and awareness of power relationships by all actors on the international scene.

That is why it is essential to refuse to make any concession to the USSR on matters of principle.

[Question] In that connection, were you satisfied with the Western reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan?

[Answer] The reaction of certain countries, France in particular, was complaisant to the say the least. Recognition of the Afghan resistance movement remains a necessity, because the legitimacy of the Kabul coup d'etat cannot be ratified by the international community. As for the sanctions applied, notably by the United States, I find it hard to make them a principle, because they are inoperative more often than not.

[Question] In your opinion, could the recent events in Poland eventually jeopardize the cohesiveness of the Soviet East European buffer states?

[Answer] The countries of Eastern Europe are all different, while they are all experiencing an economic and political crisis, that crises does not have the same forms or intensity in all countries. For a long time, all observers had considered Poland's situation to be the most difficult, in spite of Edward Gierek's international popularity. In any case, the events that continue to take place in that country prove that there is no total stability in the East, and that these are changing societies.

What must be realized--and indeed it is one of the conditions of the Polish movement's endurance--is the fact that during these events, alliances--and relations with the USSR in particular--have never been at issue.

The fact remains, however, that the struggle for individual and collective freedoms in Poland does pose basic problems for the East's social systems, problems that may entail very serious risks if the spirit of compromise among Poles is not maintained. Rather alarming in this respect are the statements published in the Soviet press or made by Czechoslovak authorities, and the measures taken by the East German Government against Poland and also against the Federal Republic of Germany.

French socialists cannot accept any external interference with efforts by the Poles to settle their difficulties by themselves. We are determined to react firmly against any attempt of this kind.

[Question] To what extent and for what reason can the Kremlin tolerate such a display of independence?

[Answer] First of all, the USSR is aware of the price it would have to pay for intervention in Poland. The USSR would be confronting a country with a population of 35 million persons imbued with a highly developed national spirit, a country that has important economic and historical relationships with Western Europe.

Furthermore, relations between forces within Poland and Soviet foreign policy's current problems--I refer to Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Madrid conference's difficult deliberations, and the new American administration's attitude toward strategic talks--do not perhaps prompt Moscow to establish a new front of difficulties.

[Question] Under present circumstances, what is the possible significance of deliberations of the Madrid conference that has been underway since last November?

[Answer] Conscious of the precariousness of the relations that had fortunately developed among them, the 35 countries represented at the Helsinki conference has made the necessary collective effort to settle matters in dispute, establish a code of conduct for themselves, and define a broad sphere of cooperation. The objective of their mutual commitments was to strengthen detente. Figuratively speaking, the signing of the Final Act made it possible to shift detente "into higher gear."

Yet, 5 years later, detente has not only downshifted into low gear but what is more, its wheels are spinning dangerously. To avoid dropping back into neutral, it is necessary, therefore, to analyze collectively the causes of this deterioration and to stop talking or acting as if nothing had happened.

From this standpoint, the Madrid conference may be the opportunity to make one or two openings in the wall of mistrust and threats.

Of course, the current violations of human rights and the rights of nations are not conducive to optimism. This is an additional reason for speaking frankly. The Madrid meeting, far from being a tribunal--which would in no way alter a deplorable situation--must primarily be a forum for a collective explanation effort. What has to be explained, again and always, and in Madrid specifically, is that, despite all dialogs, the crisis has reached a dangerous level for everyone and that it is in everyone's definite interest, and particularly the Soviet Union's, to act and act quickly. Obviously, to be heard and understood, the discourse must be plain, clear, and brief. Discussions in Madrid must not be replete with details, with lists of shortcomings, but with convictions.

Our conviction, the Socialist Party's conviction, is that in Madrid detente must be put on its feet again. We are not naive, however. We are fully aware of the limited character of the results such a meeting can produce under such circumstances.

After the explanation effort, a second course of action should be chosen and explored. It is our belief, in fact, that the Madrid meeting could usefully take up the problem of disarmament and take a step forward in what, ever since Helsinki, are known as "confidence-building measures." The meeting could decide, for example, to make these measures--voluntary up to now--immediately compulsory and broaden their sphere of applicability, notably to encompass all of Europe. Admittedly the Madrid meeting is not the conference on disarmament in Europe. Nevertheless, if taking cognizance of threats can be the beginning of wisdom, there is still a possibility that such wisdom may show itself in Madrid. Hence the importance of this meeting.

[Question] A good number of observers recently denounced the neutralist tendencies of certain European leaders. Do you believe there is a real danger that Europe may become "Finlandized"

[Answer] The expression "Finlandization" of Europe is incorrect and unkind to our Finnish friends with whose courage we are familiar. It would no doubt be better to call it a form of resignation. Everything seems to be happening as if certain nations in Europe no longer want to assume their proper responsibilities, take charge of their own destiny. We believe that we must act in favor of detente, without complaisance, and also preserve our independence.

[Question] Are you in favor . . . more thoroughly integrating the FRG into Europe's defense system, particularly in the nuclear field?

[Answer] Treaty provisions approved by the allies after World War II, and specifically those protocols prohibiting the German Armed Forces from directly possessing nuclear weapons, had several consequences in the years that followed. The first consequence was the stationing of allied forces, American forces in particular, on West German territory. This was followed by the FRG's establishment of conventional armed forces and the important part played by West Germany in NATO, the latter giving the FRG the nuclear protection it sought.

Nonratification of the European Defense Community Treaty left this situation unchanged and consequently there is now no community-wide legal basis permitting establishment of a European defense force in which the Federal Republic of Germany would be incorporated.

But beyond the question's legal aspect, we do not feel establishment of such a force, as periodically recommended by the right--the plan, for example, for protecting the European Community's oil supply lines--would have a positive effect on the search for security and detente in Europe. If the Community can demonstrate, both economically and politically, its real will to be independent of the two superpowers, the question could then be examined. At the present time, however, such an initiative seems more dangerous to peace than conducive to security.

[Question] Your party's executive board accepts "the research, development, and technological mastery" of neutron weapons while rejecting their "production and deployment." Why this restriction? Doesn't this position seem unrealistic within the context of the French defense situation, if for no more than budgetary reasons?

[Answer] The neutron weapons debate revealed that some persons wanted to give them preferential status in our armed forces. Yet these are tactical weapons, theater weapons. We strongly insist that tactical weapons need to be "coupled" with strategic weapons. Without this "coupling," the argument of deterrence would no longer have any meaning. France's desire to master neutron weapon technology may well be desirable, but if France should decide to center its equipment effort mainly on nuclear weapons for employment on the battlefield of central Europe, such action would be dangerous in many respects. Wouldn't such a decision actually mean an exclusive choice of battlefield and involve the risk of lowering the threshold of nuclear conflict? In the final analysis, would it not amount to abandoning our defense policy heretofore considered independent?

[Question] What do you make of Ronald Reagan's election as President?

[Answer] President Reagan will probably treat the foreign policy views he expressed during the campaign the same way he treated the California budget when he was governor of that state. In other words, the evolving international situation and the decline in American military power will probably lead him to revise his startling campaign statements. There is a fearful possibility, however, that to "clear the honor" of the United States, the new administration may make a symbolic show of force, and that all of this may be at the expense of Latin America, and of Nicaragua first of all.

Reagan's multiple warnings about the intolerable nature of Cuba's influence in that part of the world portend such a show of force. On the other hand, his election is not likely to produce a reversal of policy on the principle of strategic negotiations with the USSR and on the opening of discussions with China.

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the substance of a "just settlement" of the Middle East conflict?

[Answer] Peace in the Middle East can result only from direct dialogue between the parties involved. This dialogue implies reciprocal and joint recognition between Israelis and Arabs, with the Palestinians being included, of course, among the latter. It is through such dialog that an agreement for lasting peace will be found, an agreement calling for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 onto secure boundaries recognized by all. It is through this same dialogue process that the Palestinians' right to a homeland must be put into concrete form.

[Question] In this regard, do you consider a specifically European initiative similar to the Camp David process to be advisable?

[Answer] All initiatives in that direction are good. But experience has frequently shown that external initiatives are more an interplay of interests than real efforts to mediate the dispute. We hailed the peace and mediation effort expressed in the Camp David agreements. We regret the delays, excuses, and conflicts of interest that are restraining their full implementation. Under these conditions a European initiative can be of no significance unless it is based on a real attempt to establish a dialogue between the opposing parties, and to a broader extent on a dialog between the peoples of the Mediterranean.

[Question] Last summer, Francois Mitterrand said that "France, which is a regional power, must maintain a presence where its interests lie, wherever international stability is at stake, wherever it can contribute to the establishment of an international society of law." Did he mean that France must hoist itself to superpower rank? Does this not entail some risk of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

[Answer] It is out of the question for us to mistake the existence of economic, political, commercial, human, and cultural relations with interference which is actually a restriction on the sovereignty of nations. France, as socialists see it, must not retire into its shell. While preserving and developing its economic and social potential, France must make choices in its international relations in order to cope with the serious international problems of the moment.

It will not, therefore, be a question of becoming a new superpower, but of making those decisions we will have to make on the basis of our new international policy objectives. These objectives are well known and I shall recall them simply for the record: an active pro-disarmament and pro-peace policy, militant defense of the rights of nations and human rights wherever these rights are threatened, and an international policy consistent with our country's economic development needs.

Hence, for example, our relations with French-speaking African countries cannot be based on force or military interventions, thereby perpetuating a rightfully inadmissible form of colonialism. These relations must, on the contrary, be based on long- or medium-term agreements—that we call "codevelopment agreements"—which define the mutual and well-understood interests of France and these various sovereign nations.

[Question] In your view, what are the main strengths and weaknesses of French diplomacy at the present time?

[Answer] Present-day French diplomacy professes to be a balanced diplomacy of peace and friendship with nations. We question the actual application of these principles.

On the pretext of friendship with nations, French diplomacy and the person mainly responsible for that diplomacy, the President of the Republic, have an inordinate tendency to tell each government what it wants to hear. Our diplomacy's embraces with the Soviets in Warsaw are contradicted by its remarks made in Beijing. Speeches on human rights and the rights of nations are contradicted by the sumptuous receptions given in honor of Argentine military leaders, by the political and military support given South Africa's apartheid regime, and by statements on the "Afghan rebels."

These actions are not indicative of a balanced diplomacy. They are instead a comedy of relatively ineffective gestures.

Furthermore, as far as the actual interventions are concerned, we can but condemn once again an African policy whose dominant neocolonialist character cannot contribute, quite the contrary, to peace, disarmament, and international stability.

[Question] It is May 1981 and the socialist candidate has been elected President of the Republic. What will be the first five foreign policy measures taken by the new government.

[Answer] For the answer to that question, I suggest you interview our candidate. And then later, our prime minister.

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NEXT GENERAL ELECTIONS CONSIDERED CRUCIAL

Athens 1 VRADYNI in Greek 26 Feb 81 p 3

[Article by New Democracy Athens Deputy Christos Fysas: "Greece's International Position and Who Undermines It"]

[Text] It is doubtful if a significant share of the Greek people have comprehended the dimensions and magnitude of the cruciality of the next elections. The fact that secondary problems, which more or less occupy all the countries, are given precedence confirms this realization. Though the Greek voters are not responsible for this disorientation, as we will try to show, nevertheless the phenomenon is a fact and anything but contributes to forming a correct judgement on the part of voters.

It is certain that during the next electoral battle the Greek people's economic future is not going to be decided, in the sense of a miraculous transformation of the crisis to prosperity. The party which today has the responsibilities of power has been tested in practice both in periods of normal economic development and in periods of adversities. In the first case, it created the miracle of the country's economic recovery when, within eight years, it overcame the barrier of underdevelopment and led Greece into the fold of the developed countries. It took several years for this effort to be appreciated by everyone and for it to be renamed a miracle. Probably an analogous amount of time is needed for evaluation of the results of the economic policy applied during the last six years to confront the crisis which is plaguing the entire world.

Let us not forget that this crisis was the basic reason for the downfall of many European governments and the change in systems of governing, without there being desirable or expected results. Simply, the change which was effected with the succession of parties or systems caused yet another turbulence--political and economic--which extended the crisis.

Certainly no one can deny hope to people who are being tested by a crisis like today's. In fact, it could be added that the interchange of parties in power acts expansively since, in the end, the expectation of a change--even if unrealistic--leads to consciousness of the real situation, that is, that the cure is not achieved immediately

with a change in doctors or medicine, but demands above all a correct diagnosis and a persistent, steadfast struggle.

But do the prerequisites exist for a change in agents of power to act constructively in our country? The answer is categorically no. The economic problem, which in other countries was the basic motive for pursuit of change, comes to a secondary position in Greece. That which primarily will be decided during the next elections is the permanent position of Greece in the international arena. The party which aspires to succeed New Democracy in power has most clearly proclaimed its opposition to our country's present international position even though it has not, with the same clarity, suggested the alternate solution which it would apply in the sector of foreign policy.

More specifically, PASOK [*Panhellenic Socialist Movement*] has placed itself in support of our immediate departure from the military and political branch of NATO, in support of denunciation of the agreement for accession into the EEC and, generally, in support of amputation of every link our country has with the democratic West.

It must be noted that analogous positions have never been supported by other western European parties, including the socialist, but also the communist parties. This "eccentricity" of PASOK, as was shown by the first appearance of Greek deputies at the European Parliament, faces more skepticism abroad than at home. Of course, the European socialist and communist parties have a longer history and possess greater political experience than PASOK. But no European socialist or communist leader has had it in mind up to now to try disturbing the balance of powers in Europe. This is for two reasons: First, because the inclusion of the European countries in the western alliance occurred in accordance with the will of their peoples after the Second World War. Second, because even if one disputed this will, it is clear that an analogous policy would not serve the interests of his country.

There is no doubt that these estimations contributed definitively both to making the communist parties of western Europe independent in the face of Soviet guardianship and to the appearance of Eurocommunism.

Furthermore, for the sake of maintaining the balance of powers, the western world has essentially renounced any active interference in countries included in the eastern alliance which are trying to shake off their subordination to the Soviet Union. Those who talk about a corresponding American guardianship have only to compare the free formation of the domestic political situation in every western European country with the direct threat which at this moment envelops the remnants of Poland's national identity--a threat which was implemented in the most impudent way a few years ago in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

It must be noted, moreover, that the orientations of PASOK's foreign policy are the principal element of differentiation of this party from

parties of the European Left, which reject every ideologic affiliation with models of single-party socialism, like those in Syria or Libya, which Papandreu considers models.

It remains, finally, to investigate for what reasons the significance of these PASOK "positions" is minimized in Greece while, adversely, the credibility of economic promises and no-guarantee pledges of benefits is maximized. The phenomenon is due principally to the confusion which PASOK has methodically cultivated as regards its intentions in the sector of foreign policy. The people must be informed whether this confusion is a result of continuing cogitation or it is a deliberate concealment of plans and an attempt to deceive the popular base. If the former is happening, PASOK is not yet mature enough to pursue power. If the latter is happening, then the party of official opposition is directly undermining the laws and the state.

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